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Abstract 
 
 
 
The lack of generality is a structural weakness of knowledge representation formalisms. 
Here by lack of generality we mean the inability of any given representation to describe 
the infinite richness and diversity of the world and also its potentially infinite descriptions 
which are enabled by language. This lack of generality is the main cause of many of the 
difficulties encountered so far, just think of the problems which have arisen in the effort of 
creating reusable ontologies. In this thesis we propose a solution to the problem of 
generality which is based on the key idea that knowledge should not be modeled a priori, 
at design time, but it should continuously generated, adapted and evolved, from generation 
to usage. The thesis provides four main contributions: (i) a shared terminology for the 
characterization of concepts and for their computational representation; (ii) a 
formalization of the distinction between substance concepts and classification concepts; 
(iii) the integration of these two notions of concept into a general representation language 
that organizes them into a hierarchy of increasing abstraction of what is perceived, and 
(iv) a two-layered knowledge representation formalism, where the first layer allows to 
represent concepts, as the main devices for achieving generality, and where the second 
layer allows to represent concepts as the result of “adapting” a description to the current 
knowledge representation needs and requirements. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Context 
The key intuition underlying the work in knowledge representation (KR) is that the mind 
of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be modeled as a representational system that can be 
exploited for processing information. Such a system is usually seen as a set of beliefs which 
construct a mental model of the world [100]. Many KR formalisms have been devised 
under this assumption. This work has gone a long way with many success stories. Still, it 
has soon turned out that all of these formalisms suffer from a lack of generality [66], [13]. 
The lack of generality is made evident by (i) the failure in reducing diverse representations 
of the world to a single “universal” theory, and (ii) the difficulties faced in the creation of 
representations of the world that can address a changing world. 
1.2. The Problem 
The problem of (non-)generality is unavoidable and it is entangled with two fundamental 
issues that must be handled by any representation, namely world diversity and 
representation use [44]. It is simply impossible to construct a finite representation capable 
of capturing the infinite richness and diversity of the world and also the infinitely many 
possible descriptions of the world which are enabled by language. On the one hand, any 
fixed representation cannot manage the diverse and multiple inputs coming from the 
external environment. Any new encounter with the world may hide some details and 
highlight others; for any chosen representation, there will always be some aspect of the 
world that is not captured. On the other hand, any fixed representation depends always on 
a certain perspective and any change in the goals to be addressed may cause a revision of 
the current description. For any chosen representation there will always be an alternative 
way, not yet considered, to represent the same aspect of the world.  
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The problem of lack of generality has had a huge (negative) impact on AI. So far, the KR 
problem has been dealt with in isolation, as if knowledge could be modeled “from first 
principles” independently of the world generating it and of its intended use. The main 
consequence is that all the attempts to deal with semantic heterogeneity, for instance all 
the work on (reusable) ontologies and data integration (see, e.g. [41], [12]) have obtained 
only partial successes.  
1.3. The Solution 
In this thesis we propose a new approach to KR which allows to address the problem of 
generality and which is based on the key idea that knowledge should not be modeled a 
priori, at design time, but, rather, that it should continuously be generated, adapted and 
evolved, from generation to usage. The life cycle of the management of knowledge should 
be constructed as the result of the following two steps: 
 
1. knowledge acquisition, where the world input is acquired and stored into an adaptable 
and extensible KR formalism. This step allows to deal with the diversity of the world; 
2. knowledge (re)use, where the acquired knowledge is used to generate a fixed world 
representation which is adapted as a function of the requirements and goals. This step 
allows to deal with the many possible representations of the world. 
 
Thus, for instance, I can store information about cats as a function of my encounters with 
them and, in output, I can generate any desired representation of cats which is within the 
scope of what I know about cats. This thesis provides four main contributions: 
 
1. a shared terminology for the characterization of concepts and for their computational 
representation; 
2. a formalization of the distinction between substance concepts and classification 
concepts; 
3. the integration of the two above mentioned notions of concept into a general 
representation language that organizes them into a hierarchy of increasing abstraction 
of what is perceived; 
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4. a two-layered KR formalism where the first layer allows to represent concepts, as the 
main devices for achieving generality and where the second layer allows to represent 
concepts as the result of “adapting” descriptions to the current KR needs and 
requirements. 
 
Our approach, and in particular our proposed architecture is strongly influenced by the 
work on biosemantics (also known as teleosemantics) [62]. Many of the examples and 
terminology metaphors used in the following are derived from this field. Biosemantics 
provides an account of how representations carry meaning by appealing to the teleological 
notion of function. Here the notion of function maps into the one used in the context of 
neurobiology when attributing functions to components of the brain (as in “the function of 
processing visual information”). Most relevant to us is Millikan’s account of biosemantics 
and her explanation of how representations are generated in terms of consumer’s and 
producer’s abilities [74], [76], [73], [69], [93].  
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
 
• Chapter 2 introduces a survey of computational approaches to concepts 
representations, with the main goal to classify the heterogeneous computational 
approaches according the provided terminology, and to provide a reader who may 
not be very familiar with theories of concepts with introduction to major themes in 
this research and with pointers to different research projects. 
• Chapter 3 presents the central distinction between classification and substance 
concepts, providing a model of concepts as abilities, with a focus on recognition 
abilities, and an early version of an Ontology of (Recognition) Abilities (called 
RAO). 
• Chapter 4, starting from the distinction between substance and classification 
concepts, provides an early proposal for an integrated architecture enabling 
perception and reasoning. The goal here is to go a step further and to integrate these 
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two notions into a general theory of concepts which organizes them into a hierarchy 
of increasing abstraction of what is perceived. 
• Chapter 5 describes how the proposed integrated architecture can be used for 
addressing the problem of generality and the puzzle of sameness. The main goal 
here is to show how our new approach is a promising solution in supporting the 
current existing knowledge integration methodologies.  
• Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and future work, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2. A Survey of Computational Approaches to Concepts 
Representation 
 
The key assumption underlying the work in conceptual modeling is that different kinds of 
conceptual representations are needed in order to account for certain classes of cognitive 
phenomena [1]. Within the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), many cognitive 
architectures have been realized adopting different approaches for the organization and the 
representation of their conceptual system [107]. A huge work for formalizing, analyzing 
and depicting the cognitive and ontological principles that ground conceptual modeling 
processes have been addressed in [50] and [47]. The formalization of new tools, such as 
the perceptual symbol system approach [4] and the proxytype theory [86], gathered from 
different theories of concepts, has been put forward in [60] and [85]. Statistical approaches, 
such as neural nets, implementing dynamic and situated conceptual representations have 
been exploited (e.g., [67]). Computational accounts of approaches (e.g., 
simulation/embodied approaches) that ground conceptual information in modality-specific 
systems have been provided (e.g., [92]). 
 
It can be generally observed that, so far, all these different representations of concepts have 
gone a long way with many success stories. Anyhow, none of them can account for all 
aspects of cognition. Some models, for instance, are used for enabling systems to reason 
on enormous amounts of data, but fail in accounting for trivial common-sense reasoning 
[28]. Similarly, some conceptual representations are impressively successful when used in 
well-defined domains, but they are completely inefficient in cross-domains settings [97]. 
Based on this evidence, the main consideration is that artificial systems can take advantage 
of all these different conceptual representations for addressing different tasks. The key 
issue becomes then their combination into a unified view. So far, some hybrid approaches 
have been proposed [105]. Here the main goal is to take (some of) the existing 
representations, to adapt them and to integrate them in a hybrid conceptual model. 
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However, these approaches are only, partially satisfying, ad hoc solutions, and cannot 
overcome some serious integration problems. The different conceptual representations are, 
indeed, in many cases, incompatible: (they start from different modelling assumptions and 
theories of concepts, which more often are left implicit, they adopt different modeling 
constructs, and so forth) [101], [34]. 
 
The focus of modern AI on concepts and their representations makes the understanding of 
the notion of ‘concept’, and the knowledge of the core of conceptual theories, a key factor 
in this area of research. Making explicit the modelling assumptions behind the different 
approaches is, indeed, an important issue to be addressed whenever, for instance, a 
conceptual representation has to be devised and compared, or integrated, to other 
conceptual representations. This chapter provides a brief survey of the computational 
approaches to the representation of concepts. The main goals are:  
 
1. to provide a shared terminology for the characterization of concepts and their 
computational representation;  
2. to classify the heterogeneous computational approaches according the provided 
terminology, and  
3. to provide a reader who may not be very familiar with theories of concepts with 
introduction to major themes in this research and with pointers to different research 
projects.  
 
Note that this chapter does not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the state of 
the art in the representation of concepts. We refer the reader to excellent and thorough 
reviews, such as [77] or [18], for that purpose. Our central aim is, indeed, to examine, in 
the light of the existing theories of concepts, just some of the most relevant approaches, in 
order to make explicit their modelling assumptions and linking them to a common 
terminological (and theoretical) ground. The final outcome of this survey could be then 
used in order to discuss: a) criteria for finding similarities/dissimilarities between different 
ways of modelling concepts and b) criteria for devising new other possible integrated 
conceptual representations. 
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The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 groups the current approaches to concepts 
representation into three main classes. Section 2.2 provides a list of dimensions, through 
which concept representations can be compared and divided. In Section 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 
we provide a brief description of some remarkable computational implementations. Section 
2.6 provides a brief overview and comparison of the described approaches.  
2.1. Three Broad Classes of Theories 
Different theories about the nature of concepts have been proposed in cognitive science, 
neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Most of these theories are grouped according to the 
literature into two main classes: Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI) 
theories and New Fangled Artificial Intelligence (NFAI), or post-classical, theories [6]. 
Along with the GOFAI and NFAI theories, there are theories combining assumptions that 
ground both GOFAI and NFAI theories. We call these theories Complementary Fangled 
Artificial Intelligence (CFAI) theories. 
GOFAI. These theories are also known as classical-symbolic theories and provide perhaps 
one of the best known and most widely accepted view of concepts. According to this view, 
concepts are explicit representations codified in a language, similar to the first-order 
predicate calculus. The main features of these type of representations, also called 
propositional [83], are arbitrariness and discreteness. Concepts can be seen indeed as 
symbols of the language of thought (LOT) [32]. They are arbitrary in the sense that the 
similarity between them and what is represented is not needed. They are discrete because 
they are complex expressions separable in smaller parts, or they are atomic parts without 
any internal structure. Arbitrariness and discreteness allow the propositional 
representations of concepts to be highly formal and abstract.  
NFAI. These theories have been developed in recent years and are also known as post-
classical theories. The NFAI class can be divided into two main sub-classes: the situated 
robotics theories and the connectionist theories. The situated robotics program still need to 
be consolidated and cannot be considered as genuine theory, however it is being tested and 
used in many AI researches and applications (e.g., dynamical systems). Differently from 
the situated robotics, the connectionist research program has a long story and dates backs 
to the 40’s [68], [53]. The many success stories of the symbolic approach around the 50’s 
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and 60’s put connectionism in the shade for a long period. However, in the late 80’s it 
began to increase again its popularity. Connectionism shares the computational hypothesis 
of the symbolic approach, but providing a different model for concepts. In particular, 
according to this view, concepts can be seen as representations distributed throughout a 
large number of processing elements [34]. Concepts are embedded in a network composed 
by interconnected units, which, at a certain level of abstraction, simulate the behavior of a 
conglomerate of neural cells. So far, even if they cannot be considered as a proper models 
of real neural systems, different types of (artificial) neural networks have been successfully 
adopted for addressing specific AI tasks. 
CFAI. These theories are not in contrast with the GOFAI and NFAI programs. What we 
call CFAI theories rely, indeed, on assumptions that may be shared by both the previously 
described classes of theories. They can be seen as complementary views introduced in 
order to model aspects of cognition that are difficult to be modeled with GOFAI and NFAI 
frames only. Under the category of CFAI theories we group the procedural theories, the 
analogical theories, and the prototype-exemplar-theory (PET) theories. Procedural 
theories raised during the 70s and their slogan says that is not necessary for a concept to 
be explicitly represented as a mental symbol [55]. According to procedural theories 
concepts can be implicitly represented as a “procedure”, i.e., as the execution of a piece of 
an algorithm. According to this framework, having a concept is having a capability to do 
something. For instance, having the concept of ‘Cat’ is having the ability of recognizing 
something as a ‘Cat’ or having the capability of using it in inference processes (i.e., it is an 
animal). Similarly, the analogical theories, around the late 60s, introduced another new 
interpretation of concepts. According to these theories, concepts are analogical (and not 
propositional, like in the classical-symbolic theories) representations. These kinds of 
representation are defined as mental objects that are similar to the objects they represent, 
like, for instance a picture of a cat or the image of a cat on my eye retina [96]. Differently 
from the propositional concepts introduced by GOFAI, the analogical concepts are not 
claimed to be discrete. This means that concepts do not provide a selection of features and 
the whole perceptual information are collected (this is a value for concreteness and 
completeness but, for instance, is a problem for compositionality and abstraction. For 
further information, see sections below). Another interesting issue is that, with their 
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representation of concepts, analogical theories provide an account for simulation (see for 
instance proxy-types) processes in cognition [4], [86]. Among the CFAI theories we have 
what we call PET theories. Here we group three kinds approaches to concepts 
representation that are very similar, i.e., the prototypical approach, the exemplar approach 
and the theory approach.  According to the prototypical approach, concepts provide the 
representation of the “most typical” occurrence for a given perceived object. Concepts are 
prototypes, i.e., a sort of weighted set of features (e.g., the prototype for ‘Apple’ is 
something round, green, red or yellow, with a specific range of weight, and so forth). In 
the exemplar view concepts can be seen as devices storing information about specific 
example occurrences for a given perceived object (e.g., the information about the apples 
we encountered in our experience). Within the theory approaches concepts are represented 
as (micro-)theories. For instance, having a concept for ‘Apple’ means having (micro-
)theory about apples. 
 
Fig. 1. Theories of concepts: a classification. 
2.2. A characterization of Conceptual Representations 
GOFAI, NFAI and CFAI programs rely on different assumptions about the nature of 
concepts and underlie different strategies for their representation. All these strategies of 
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representation can be analyzed along seven different dimensions1: intentionality, coverage, 
shareability, typicality, compositionality, formality and flexibility. Any type of conceptual 
representation can be indeed reduced to a way of addressing (following different 
approaches) one or more issues related to these dimensions. To make the explanation clear, 
we describe each dimension using the symbolic and the connectionist theories as reference 
examples. Let us look briefly at each of these in turn. 
Intentionality. The notion of intentionality is needed for giving an account of how 
concepts can be about, represent, or stand for, things (or state of affairs). Intentionality is 
essential for explaining the semantics of any given conceptual model. Within the symbolic 
paradigm, a key line of research that account for intentionality is the so called causal 
approach to mental content [2]. According to this view, a concept of something in the 
world is basically a representation caused by this “something” (articulated in terms of sets 
of properties). The assumption here is that a concept C represents something S, if and only 
if S causes C. The basic idea is that any conceptual representation is derived by and 
covaries with what it represents, according to a causal relation. Similarly, within the 
connectionist frame, there are approaches on which the notion of intentionality plays an 
important role. Here concepts are represented as patterns of activation in a network of 
simple nodes. Even if these patterns are difficult to be semantically evaluated, they are 
always to be considered in relation to intentional activities.  
Coverage. A desideratum of a conceptual model is that it can be used for representing all 
the types of concepts (see, for instance, individual concepts, e.g., here, Venus, etc., 
properties, e.g., yellow, near; living being concepts, e.g., animal, plant, stuff 
concepts, e.g., milk, gold; abstract concepts, e.g., music, information; role 
concepts, student, father; action concepts, create, move, etc.). Providing a model 
for concepts considering just few examples and the generalizing the model to all the 
possible types of concepts lead to unconvincing results. Within the models grounded on 
the symbolic approach we have an account for a large variety of concepts. The concepts 
that are more suitable to be modeled in a connectionist frame are kinds that are concrete or 
                                                
1 These seven characteristics are derived from an analysis of the explanations provided in [26], 
[98], [77], [18] and [83].  
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singular concepts, i.e., concepts that are strongly grounded in perception (e.g., basic level 
categories) [101].  
Shareability. Another important feature of concepts is that they have to be shareable 
between human and artificial agents [26]. The shareability dimension of concepts is 
typically supported by their explicit representation. In the classical symbolic paradigm 
concepts are constructed from constituent symbols and syntactic combination of these 
symbols, and they can be seen as the descriptive product of human designers. This support 
the shareability of the symbolic models. However, an important issue is that, so far, it has 
proven impossible to develop fully reusable and shareable symbolic representations (see, 
for instance, ontologies [49]), the motivation being the set of underlying assumptions that 
always underlies their design. In the connectionist approach concepts are implicit 
representations associated to an activation pattern, distributed over different units (or 
“nodes”), where each unit is involved in the representation of different concepts (this 
characteristic is the reason of why the connectionist paradigm is also called sub-symbolic 
paradigm). The “opacity” of connectionist model of concepts is a classical well-known 
problem for their shareability. Any of these models behaves as a sort of black box and the 
interpretation for units and connections weight is always deeply complex. 
Typicality. Around the mid-70s of the last century the empirical results of Eleanor Rosch 
[89] demonstrated the necessity of a new model for capturing both the structure of ordinary 
common sense concepts and the categorization processes. The results obtained by Rosch 
showed that most of the ordinary concepts often exhibit typicality effects, i.e., they have 
common features that are central in the recognition and categorization of perceived objects. 
Approaches addressing typicality can be seen as complementary views of the classical 
symbolic approaches, they were introduced to address some new cognitive issues. This 
dimension seems to be well-addressed in the connectionist models as well, where concepts 
correspond to distributed representations with a position in a multidimensional semantic 
space [101].  
Compositionality. This dimension refers to the capability of producing infinite complex 
concepts starting from a finite set of atomic concepts. This is an essential feature for 
explaining conceptual systems productivity [33]. Concepts compositionality is well 
addressed by symbolic approaches, where it is achieved through the application of certain 
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syntactic rules. In the connectionist approaches compositionality seems very difficult to be 
addressed [34]. It is not clear if this depends only on technical issues and some solutions 
can be provided with few modifications of the existing models. A connectionist model that 
seem to be able to capture some compositional properties of the symbolic models is the so 
called recurrent neural network (RNN) [29].  
Formality. Cognition involves many rational and logical processes. Formality (along with 
abstraction and discreteness) seems to be a key dimension for modelling conceptual 
information and using it for enabling rational behaviors. For instance, just think of the 
reasoning activities performed by an agent. These are built upon inference mechanisms 
dealing with formal and consistent information. Within the symbolic frames, formality is 
a key dimension. For this reason, most of the systems devised according to the symbolic 
principles are targeted for enabling forms of logic-valid automatic processes. Differently, 
formality is not a central dimension in the connectionist frames and the development of 
solutions for supporting rational tasks grounded on the connectionist approach is not so 
widely explored. Anyhow, recently interesting connectionist experiments, suitable, for 
instance, to address logical deduction, are being devised, see for instance neural reasoners 
[84]. 
Flexibility. The high flexibility of biological cognitive agents is a pivotal feature of their 
cognition system (see, for instance, learning, evolution and adaptation tasks). The focus 
on formal semantics and LOT makes flexibility, comparatively speaking, difficult to be 
addressed for models built upon a symbolic approach. Any update, modification or 
elimination task have a huge impact on the whole symbolic system. Nevertheless, there 
have been some developments of flexible symbolic models, see for instance default logic 
[9], fuzzy logic [57] systems. In the context of connectionist paradigm, the very foundation 
has always been learning. This presupposes the high flexibility of connectionist models, 
which is addressed by tuning of weights or other parameters in huge networks [101]. Due 
to such a flexibility, connectionist models excel at dealing with incompleteness, 
inconsistency, uncertainty, approximate information, and so forth, and seem to be high 
capable of simulating some complex cognitive behavior of biological agents.  
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2.3. Classical-Symbolic Representations 
A perfect example of a computational approach to conceptual representation that is 
influenced by classical-symbolic principles is the modelling of ontologies [Ref.]. The most 
widely shared definition of ontology in the computer science community is “a formal, 
explicit specification of a shared conceptualization” [49]. Such a definition can be seen as 
derived from the composition of different definitions [104]. Ontologies can be seen as 
complex data structures, i.e., information artifacts, which can be designed (and formalized) 
using different representational languages, see for instance RDF2 and OWL3, following 
different principles (e.g., OntoClean [47]). All the languages used for representing these 
“conceptualizations” can be reduced to a fragment of first order logic (FOL) and can be 
seen as a perfect instantiation of what in the classical-symbolic frame is taken as LOT [32]. 
The main goal of these artifacts is to support knowledge representation (KR) and 
integration tasks, but they can be used for other tasks as well (see for instance driving NLP, 
or providing a data exchange formats). DOLCE4 and BFO5 are two example of top-level 
ontologies, i.e., ontologies representing cross-domain knowledge. Both of them are 
designed according to well-defined principles and are used in many different ontology 
design and integration tasks. OWL-Time6 and the Organization7 ontology are typical 
examples of what in the ontology design community are called “core ontologies”, i.e., 
ontologies (more specific that top-level ontologies) expressing and specifying some 
concepts that can be shared among different area of knowledge. OWL-Time is an ontology 
expressed in OWL-28, describing temporal concepts, enabling the ability to express facts 
about topological relations among intervals and instants, together with information about 
temporal position, frequency and durations. The Organization ontology provide a 
conceptualization representing the structure of organizations (e.g., business organizations, 
educational organization, an d so forth). It is designed in order to equip specific domain 
                                                
2 https://www.w3.org/RDF/ 
3 https://www.w3.org/OWL/ 
4 http://www.loa.istc.cnr.it/old/DOLCE.html 
5 http://ifomis.uni-saarland.de/bfo/ 
6 https://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time/ 
7 https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-org/ 
8 https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/ 
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applications with information about organizations and roles. The Wine9 ontology is another 
example of ontology, i.e., a domain ontology. Such an ontology is often used as reference 
object for tutorials and ontology design tasks, and provide a representations of wines, 
winery and all the objects needed for expressing this specific area of knowledge. 
 
All these computational artefacts provide an abstraction of (a portion of) the world and are 
used to enable software systems in addressing some specific (high-level) intelligent tasks. 
Looking at the dimensions provided in the previous section, there are some main 
observations. From the point of view of coverage, ontologies can be used for modelling a 
huge varieties of concepts. As a check we can take the huge number of ontological 
vocabularies collected in LOV10. Let us take, for instance, Schema.org11, which can be 
expressed and formalized as an ontology (see the its RDF formalization) and the set of its 
“commonly used types”. We have concepts like CreativeWork, Artifact, Event, 
Organization, Person and Place; concepts like Action (e.g., defining actions like 
Assess, Achieve, Move, Organize, along with Create, Reproduce, and so 
forth). Similarly, we have concepts of roles like Creator or Student, concepts of 
properties like Gender, JobTitle, Nationality, and so forth.  
 
Ontologies may also provide interesting insights on how to address the shareability issue. 
The main goal of ontologies is indeed “to enable computers and people to work in 
cooperation” [8]. Here shareability is addressed by providing an explicit and formal 
representation of each concept. For instance, the concept Person and Nationality 
map into a specific logical formula that can be reused among different software agents and 
can be used by humans for understanding the intended model behind the concept 
representations. Along with shareability, the concepts represented with ontologies are 
characterized by formality and compositionality. Firstly, they are indeed used for enabling 
logic-based process and their main role is to discretize and schematize the information 
coming from the external environment. Secondly, they can be seen as symbols of a 
                                                
9 https://www.w3.org/TR/owl-guide/wine.rdf 
10 http://lov.okfn.org/dataset/lov/ 
11 http://schema.org/ 
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propositional formal language, characterized by a specific syntax and different 
compositional rules. 
 
For what concerns intentionality ontologies are for sure representation of concepts that aim 
to capture what these concepts are about. The pivotal point here is that world objects are 
mapped into key basic constructs, i.e., instances which should point to specific world 
object (or an occurrence of them). This enable the class-relational structure encoding 
ontologies with a formal semantics. Formal semantics is necessary for supporting 
intelligent logic-based tasks (see for instance reasoning) but involve losing the tie with the 
external environment. Loosely speaking, do ontology concepts refer to real world objects, 
or to a formal representation of them, i.e., instances?  
 
The default features of ontologies do not allow to address the typicality and flexibility 
dimensions. Anyhow, there is a huge research work on ontology evolution and adaptation 
(see [80] for more details and [9], [57] as examples of formalism) and typicality is 
addressed by some complementary approaches that can be integrated to more classical 
models (for further details see Section 6 below). 
2.4. Connectionist and Embodied Representations 
Neural networks are typical computational representations inspired by the connectionist 
view of concepts. These artifacts can be reduced to a set of interconnected units, i.e., 
abstract representation of neurons, where any connection between these neurons is an 
abstract representation of a synapse. According to these representations, each unit is 
associated to a numerical value, i.e., an activation state (or firing, namely the frequency by 
which a neuron sends signals through synapses). Each connection between neuron 
representation units is characterized by a weight that codifies the strength of that 
connection. The influence of a unit x on a unit y is given by the activation value of the unit 
x multiplied by the weight of the connection from x to y. The weight value can be positive 
or negative so that the signal sent through the connection can activate or deactivate the 
neuron reached by the signal. So far, a lot of neural networks have been devised for 
capturing aspects of cognition. Feed forward networks (FF or FFNN) [91] are usually 
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employed on pattern recognition tasks. These are powerful networks characterized by three 
layers of different units: input units, hidden units and output units. The connections of FF 
networks are always unidirectional, i.e., they start always from an input unit through a 
hidden unit until an output unit. One interesting aspect of these networks is that they can 
be easily trained, i.e., they can learn how to produce results and tune their activation state 
by using a back-propagation mechanism. This allow the network to improve their reactions 
to given inputs and then improve their results. Besides FF networks we have many other 
(more or less recent) kinds of neural networks, for instance: radial basis function (RBF) 
networks [21], hopfield network (HN) [54], Markov chains (MC) or discrete time Markov 
Chain, (DTMC) [51], deep belief networks (DBN) [7] and deep residual networks (DRN) 
[52]. Each of them was devised for enabling some specific artificial activities. 
 
Looking at the dimensions provided in the previous section, there are some main 
observations. From the point of view of intentionality we may say that connectionist 
representations of concepts share the same goal of the classical approaches. Anyhow, 
neural networks, in addition, provide interesting performances on dealing with partial or 
wrong information. This means that they can infer new information starting from the 
available partial information. In other words, they can run induction processes by which 
unknown properties of objects can be discovered starting from the properties of objects 
that we already known. Formality and compositionality are not pivotal requirements of 
these models, since they do not commit to a formal semantics. For what concerns the 
shareability dimension, we can say that this is not a key dimension as well. Here concepts 
are not explicitly represented, but derived by some properties of the net: this limit their 
human understandability and the possibility to share them among different situations and 
agents. Similarly, coverage is not a priority within this framework. By contrast, neural 
networks can perfectly address the typicality and flexibility dimensions. These information 
artefacts are indeed able to generate prototypical representations by generalizing from the 
collected data. This is mainly because they are the result of a training process enabled by 
the adaptation and evolution capability of the entire net. 
 
Among the NFAI computational representations of concepts we have the so called 
embedded (or situated) approaches, which are usually implemented by the situated robotics 
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research program. A key exemplification of these approaches is the work by the MIT 
research group, managed by Rodney Brooks [20]. This group is building robots that are 
equipped with simple sensory-motor devices and a collection of modules. Each of these 
modules are specialized for addressing a specific task, such as checking for the presence 
of an obstacle, avoiding an obstacle, exploring, and so forth. Each of these activities is run 
by a processor that works together with other processors and exchange information with 
the sensory-motor system and other processors. In these models no explicit representations 
are provided and no data is stored. The robots are not equipped with a mental model; they 
are automata that can be described just through finite states [83]. All the information used 
by these agents is grasped from the environment. Here concepts can be seen only as 
temporary representations, information flows, built upon the different phases of the 
perceptual process. The main goal is to derive the useful information from the environment, 
send them to the right processors and then produce an action. Thus, every robot can be seen 
just as a collection of behaviors in competition [19]. From an external point of view, it is 
possible to detect coherent behavioral patterns. However, locally, these robots are 
characterized by just casual processes. The robots devised following the situated 
approaches seem to be able to reproduce the cognitive capabilities of some insects, and, 
according to recent results, seems that can be evolved by introducing new processing 
modules connected to the others.  
 
The embodied approaches offer interesting insights for understanding how to address a 
conceptual representation task. The main findings are the following. Firstly, it seems to be 
possible to address cognitive tasks without having explicit representations of the external 
environment. As showed by Rodney Brooks automata different tasks may just be 
controlled by perceptual-motor loops. Secondly, grounding cognitive tasks in perception 
may be useful for addressing the so called frame problem, i.e., the difficulty of a cognitive 
agent to adapt to specific and different situations, given the abstract and rigid nature of 
their internal representations. An agent that is embodied in the context and the environment 
seem to be more capable of adaptation. It is clear that the pivotal dimension addressed by 
the embodied approaches is the one of flexibility. It is interesting to notice how, within this 
framework, differently from neural networks, flexibility must be grounded on sensory-
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motor devices, and how the main assumption is that “intelligent behaviours are possible 
without representations”, i.e., collecting data only form the external environment. 
2.5. Complementary Representations 
Besides the approaches supporting the classical idea of concepts as symbols of a language 
of thought, characterized by a propositional nature, we have approaches supporting the idea 
that concepts are analogical representations. According to these frameworks concepts are 
mental entities that are similar to the entities they represent, i.e., they are like pictures of 
(portions of) reality. In AI this view is well supported by research result like [96] and rises 
the issue of how some cognitive process are grounded on imagination and deal with mental 
images. The underlying assumption of the analogical approaches is that perception plays a 
central role in cognition. This lead them to focus on the relevance of simulation processes 
and share some hypothesis with the embodied approaches to representation. There is a lack 
of computational frameworks implementing the analogical approach, however, recently, 
some solution grounded on this paradigm are being developed. For instance, see the work 
in [92], whose attempt is to provide a computational accounts of cognition in modality-
specific processing [6]. Furthermore, examples of attempts in implementing simulations 
are in [23], [22], [56] and [81]. The difficulty to formalize the analogical approach seems 
to be the main reason of why a mature computational account of this framework still need 
to be provided. However, there are not a priori reasons why formalization is impossible. 
The main conceptual dimension addressed by this view are for sure, intentionality and 
flexibility. Concepts as analogical representations are taken to be mirror images of 
something that is outside the mind and, they are considered as simulations of what is 
experienced and they are taken to be adaptable and flexible according to the variations 
provided by perception. 
 
Among the complementary approaches we have also the procedural representations. 
Differently from the analogical approaches, we have more computational frameworks 
implementing the ideas of these approaches. For those in AI starting from the procedural 
frame, the key idea is that concepts can be implicitly represented as fragments of 
algorithms. Concepts can be reduced to a sort of know-how that is not explicitly 
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representable by means of data structures. However, these algorithms need some explicit 
information, or data structures, to work. Thus, procedural approaches do not exclude the 
possibility that the mental content is partially determined by some explicit information, but 
they state that such content is determined by the operations performed over it. Every 
representation is both involved in a causal relation with the external environment and in a 
causal relation with some mental operations. Good examples of computational frameworks 
linked to procedural semantics are semantic networks like KL-ONE [16] (for a detailed 
description see [30] [15]) and resources like WordNet12 or FrameNet13 inspired by 
Inferential Role Semantics (IRS), Lexical Semantics (LS) or Frame Semantics  [31], i.e., a 
semantic theories that underlie lot of the procedural assumptions. Moreover, we have 
works like the one in [40] with a particular focus on teleosemantics [69], providing its 
(partial) formalization, its application in the context of KR and its integration with the 
classical approach. Within the procedural framework, for sure, coverage and shareability 
dimensions are not taken as priorities. Usually, procederual representations apply to some 
certain kinds of concepts only (e.g., there are no accounts for property concepts), and since 
these concepts are often modeled as implicit procedures or not formalized networks, they 
are not claimed to be sharable. Similarly, for what concerns the typicality, there is a lack 
of results addressing this dimension. Intentionality, on the other side, is of course a central 
issue, since the main assumption underlying proceduralism is that concepts are causally 
related to the external environment. Formality and compositionality are in some extent 
addressed by some computational approaches, but they are not in the agenda of the original 
procedural program. Finally, flexibility seems to be a well addressed dimension, concepts 
can be seen indeed as devices that change in relation to the environment and the specific 
task that need to be addressed. In this regard see for instance the notion of function provided 
by teleosemantics [62].   
 
Among the complementary theories we can find another group of theories, i.e., what we 
called PET. Is not easy to trace back these approaches to a computational framework. 
However, we can find some work in AI explicitly taking some of the ideas grounding these 
theories and trying to better cover some dimensions of their representations. An exemplar 
                                                
12 https://wordnet.princeton.edu/ 
13 https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/ 
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computational work exploiting some of the features of prototypical an exemplar theories 
is the one provided by Lieto and Frixione [60], which is also partially inspired by the theory 
of conceptual spaces (see [38]). Here the main goal is to combine the typicality effects of 
a prototypical representation with the compositionality effects of a more classical 
representation of concepts. The result is a sort of hybrid architecture, i.e., what they call 
DUAL-PECCS [61]. This is basically an integrated KR system aiming at supporting 
artificial cognitive capabilities such as categorization, by implementing classical, 
prototypical and exemplar-based representations of concepts. For what concern the theory 
theories, in some extent, we may say that core ontologies are examples of computational 
applications. Just think the organization core ontology: as we showed in Section 4, this is 
a typical formalism grounded on the symbolic frame, however it can be also seen as a 
(formal) micro-theory representing the corresponding concept.  
2.6. A summary Overview of the Computational Approaches 
In Table 1 below we list the computational implementations we described, grouping them 
according to the classification provided in Section 2 and the characterization provided in 
Section 3.  
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Table 1.  Comparing different computational approaches to concepts representations  
  CONCEPT REPRESENTATION CLASSES 
  Classical  
Representations 
Post-classical  
Representations 
Complementary  
Representations   
C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IZ
A
T
IO
N
 D
IM
E
N
SI
O
N
S 
In
te
nt
io
na
lit
y 
ü Ontologies 
are devised to 
capture a 
representation of 
what exist and can be 
easily traced back to 
a representational 
approach where 
intentionality is a 
pivotal requirements 
(see [49]) 
ü Neural 
networks are always 
involved in tasks that 
simulate intentional 
activities. Example of 
particular interests are 
FFNN [91] 
ü The existence 
of an external 
environment is a key 
assumption of the 
embodied approaches 
[19] 
ü A mandatory 
requirement for both 
analogical and procedural 
theories [15] 
ü A key dimension for 
all the PET theories [36] 
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C
ov
er
ag
e 
ü Ontologies 
provide an account 
for a large variety of 
concepts, see for 
instance huge 
resources as 
Schema.org 
û Not a pivotal 
dimension. 
Connectionist 
approaches provide an 
account for specific 
kind of concepts (see 
for instance empirical 
concepts involved in 
learning and prediction 
[34]. 
û According to 
the embodied 
approaches concepts 
are just behavioural 
patterns. Their 
classification and 
characterization is not 
addressed [19]   
û This dimension is not 
covered by procedural and 
analogical programs, since 
both of them are focused on 
empirical concept (most of 
the examples are grounded 
on vision [83] 
û The range of concepts 
that can be represented by 
PET theories is for sure 
wider than the one covered 
by analogical and procedural 
theories, however it is still 
limited (abstract concepts are 
not addressed, property 
concepts are not considered, 
and so forth [26] 
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Sh
ar
ea
bi
lit
y 
ü A pivotal 
dimension addressed 
by ontologies (used 
in their evaluation, 
which, as for [104], 
should be 
characterized by an 
explicit (human 
understandable) 
representation of 
concepts 
û Not a pivotal 
dimension, mainly 
because of the sub-
symbolic nature of 
neural networks (this 
issue is discussed 
mainly in [101]) 
û Not a pivotal 
dimension, mainly 
because of the anti-
representational view 
of the embodied 
approaches [83] 
û According to 
analogical and procedural 
programs, concepts are not 
claimed to be shareable, they 
are internal (or local) 
representations/processes 
and the issue of how these 
can be shared among agents 
is not explicitly addressed 
[18], [83] 
ü PET theories account 
for shareability. Prototypical 
and exemplar effects, for 
instance, are claimed to be 
shareable among different 
agents [36] 
T
yp
ic
al
ity
 
û Usually this 
dimension is not 
addressed. 
Ontologies are 
characterized by a 
lack of prototypical 
or exemplar 
information (for 
further explanation 
see [37]) 
ü Neural 
networks are able to 
generate prototypical 
representations by 
generalizing from the 
collected data [83] 
û According to 
the embodied 
approaches it is 
possible to derive 
behavioural patterns 
[20], but these are far 
from capturing 
prototypical or 
exemplar effects  
û There is a lack of 
work in addressing this 
dimension within the 
analogical and procedural 
frames [83] 
ü A pivotal feature, 
perfectly addressed by 
prototypical and exemplar 
models [36] 
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C
om
po
si
tio
na
lit
y 
ü A typical 
characteristic of 
ontologies, which 
can be seen  as a 
computational 
instantiation of LOT 
[32];  see for 
instance 
atomic/complex 
concepts distinction 
in DLs [3] 
û Not a pivotal 
dimension, mainly 
because of the sub-
symbolic nature of 
neural networks, see 
the discussion in [34] 
û The anti-
representational view 
of the embodied 
approaches does not 
allow to cover this 
dimension [19] 
û This is not a 
requirement for analogical 
and procedural 
representations [26] 
û This dimension is not 
clearly captured by PET 
approaches, however there is 
a lively debate on this issue 
[37], for instance, describes 
how prototypes can be 
compositional 
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Fo
rm
al
ity
 
ü Ontologies 
enables forms of 
logic-based systems, 
some of their most 
central features are 
formality, 
abstractness and 
discreteness ([50], 
[49]) 
û NNs are 
devised according to a 
well-defined 
formalisms and in 
some cases, see for 
instances the hybrid 
approaches described 
in [84], can be mapped 
to logic, however they 
are not devised for 
logic-based systems 
û The conceptual 
representation of 
embodied approaches 
can just be inferred. 
Locally, concepts are 
not represented and 
there is no formalism 
depicting a mental 
model. Each activity is 
the casual result of the 
composition of some 
processes and 
mechanisms [19]  
û Even if there are 
some work that are starting 
to provide a formal account, 
these dimension is still far to 
be addressed in the context 
of procedural and analogical 
views 
ü A pivotal feature, 
perfectly addressed by 
prototypical and exemplar 
models [26] 
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Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 
û Not a pivotal 
dimension, partially 
addressed by 
adopting some ad 
hoc methodologies 
(see ontology 
evolutions 
techniques in [80]) 
ü A pivotal 
dimension in NN, 
which is addressed 
by tuning of weights 
or other parameters 
in huge networks 
[101]. Neural 
networks are central 
in capturing these 
aspects and this 
makes them essential 
in tasks involving, for 
instance, learning 
and adaptation  
ü Embodied 
approaches are 
devised mainly to 
address this 
dimension. The main 
outcome of these 
approaches is that 
robots can easily 
adapt to the external 
environment [20] 
ü Not explicitly 
addressed by analogical 
approaches, but clearly 
addressed by procedural 
approaches [15] 
û This is cannot be 
considered a key 
dimension of PET 
approaches, and so far their 
ways of addressing 
flexibility still need to be 
clearly discussed [37] 
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Concepts as (Recognition) Abilities 
Concepts are an essential notion for the understanding of human thought. They allow us to 
give an account of phenomena such as knowledge acquisition and representation, language 
understanding, inference, and categorization [59]. A mainstream line of research on this 
topic, called in the philosophical literature Descriptionism [75], takes concepts to be 
classes. According to this view, a concept of something in the world is a representation of 
this “something”, articulated in terms of sets of properties. Descriptionism has had a large 
influence on the work in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Knowledge Representation (KR) 
and has motivated various KR languages. The main focus of this work has been (and still 
is) on how concepts can be used to organize knowledge via the classification of instances 
into classes as a function of their properties. Although KR formalisms have been used in 
several applications with many success stories, there are still many open issues related, for 
instance, to the several roles played by concepts in cognition, see, e.g., [59] for a discussion 
of some of the issues which arise with this approach.  
 
Lately, the field of Teleosemantics has proposed an alternative approach. According to this 
school of thought, concepts implement suitable (biological) functions. The shift is from the 
study of the means by which the world is represented to the study of the means by which 
such representations are generated. Here the notion of function is the same as that used in 
neurobiology when attributing functions to components of the brain (as in “the function of 
processing visual information”). According to this view, concepts are components 
(devices) of the human brain characterized by sets of abilities of performing, under certain 
conditions, specific functions. Most relevant to us is the work by Ruth Millikan [107]. 
Millikan’s work concentrates on what she calls substance concepts, namely, specific types 
of concepts which can be characterized as abilities of recognizing a certain type of items, 
that she calls substances, which are perceived as being part of the real world [70]. 
Substance concepts have the main function of collecting and accumulating knowledge 
from the world.  
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The goal of the work described in this chapter is to lay the foundations of a unified theory 
of perception and KR that integrates the results from the two approaches above. The 
underlying intuition is to think of all types of concepts as abilities, to identify the different 
forms of functions, and corresponding representations, and to study how these functions 
can be composed as part of an overall process enabling cognition. Thus, if substance 
concepts are recognition abilities, when we concentrate on the classification task, as it is 
the case in KR, we think of concepts as classification abilities, namely as abilities “... of 
simplifying the environment, of reducing the load on memory, and of helping us to store 
and retrieve information efficiently. …” [75], [64]. This chapter provides the following 
three contributions: 
 
a) It provides a model of concepts as recognition abilities by clarifying their role and by 
defining their main characteristics. This work can be seen as providing a rationalization 
and formalization of Millikan’s work. The main result is a precise characterisation of 
the similarities but also the (non-trivial) differences between concepts as recognition 
abilities and concepts as classification abilities. 
b) Based on the results above, it provides the definition of an (early version of an) ontology 
RAO, for Ontology of (Recognition) Abilities, as the basis for an integrated study of the 
two types of concepts. 
c) It provides the beginning of a methodology for how to use RAO for discovering which 
concepts as classification abilities, among those contained in the state of the art 
ontologies, correspond also to recognition abilities.   
 
It is important to notice that, within KR, various approaches have attempted to provide 
broader notions of concepts and/or to overcome some of the existing limitations. Some 
examples are: methodologies for making explicit the semantics of the underlying 
conceptual models inside KR languages [50], the analysis of cognitive and ontological 
principles that ground knowledge engineering processes [46], the implementation of new 
conceptual theories, with a sound cognitive foundation, such as conceptual spaces [2], [38], 
the perceptual symbol system approach [6], [85], the proxy-type theory [60], [86]. In 
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addition to these theories we may find works addressing the problem of empirical 
classification and of how to build representations from “observations” [11], [58]. The work 
described in this chapter is orthogonal to this work and, as far as we know, it is the first 
attempt to provide a unified view of concepts as recognition abilities and as classification 
abilities.    
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 defines the notion of substance concept. 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 analyse the various kinds of substance concepts. Section 3.4 provides 
a comparison between concepts as recognition abilities and concepts as classification 
abilities. Section 3.5 introduces RAO and its main categories. Section 3.6 provides an 
example of how to use RAO for the identification of substance concepts among the 
concepts which are used in state of the art ontologies. Finally, Section 3.7 analyses the 
implications of the results presented in this chapter for the development of complex AI 
systems which integrate recognition and knowledge representation, as a first (small) step 
towards a unified architecture for cognition. 
3.1. Substances and Substance Concepts 
We model how things are in terms of subjects able to experience the world, where by world 
we mean anything that is external to the subjects themselves. We call these subjects, 
perceptual-cognitive systems (PCSs) [71] to emphasize our focus on the study of systems 
where perception and knowledge are integrated.  
 
Time is the horizon over which PCSs and the world “meet”. A PCS experiences the world 
through encounters. An encounter is the event through which (a portion of) the world 
manifests itself to a PCS. We call such part of the world, substance, where, quoting 
Millikan, “… substances are those things about which you can learn from one encounter 
something of what to expect on other encounters, where this is no accident but the result 
of a real connection” [75]. The uniquely identifying characteristic of substances is their 
ability to manifest some form of invariance through multiple encounters. This invariance 
is grounded in what we call the substance causal factor [72], meaning by this an inner 
characteristic which is associated to a substance and which is the cause of its invariance 
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across encounters. In turn, this invariance takes the form of a set of outer characteristics 
which occur across encounters and allow for the recognition of a substance. Thus, for 
instance, cats14, like all species, are characterized by a homeostatic mechanism which, in 
turn, causes them to possess a certain set of common traits (e.g., in shape or weight) and, 
often but not always, to look similar.  
 
As from the above quote, substances are subjects of learning, namely, of the generation of 
new knowledge from perception. This process is enabled by substance concepts, where 
substance concepts are taken to be recognition abilities, namely abilities which allow a 
PCS to realize that the substance involved in the current encounter is the same substance 
as from previous encounters. Substance concepts implement functions that allow to 
recognize a substance as such and to learn and to cumulate the new knowledge about it 
through a sequence of encounters. They allow to recognize sameness of content in time 
and also to group pieces of information together, as being from the same substance [70]. 
Substance concepts are innate abilities, which are at the core of cognition, which match the 
stimuli coming from substances (what we call signals) and which allow humans to generate 
knowledge from signals. Consider, for instance, the substance concept “cat”15: we can 
observe today that cats drink milk or that scratch when we disturb them and this knowledge 
will be confirmed in future encounters.  
 
The set of (outer) characteristics that a substance manifests over encounters are matched 
with a set of substance property concepts, or simply, (substance) properties, which are 
associated to its corresponding substance concept. Substance properties play a central role 
in the recognition of substances. A substance property is an ability to discriminate a 
substance characteristic over encounters. This ability is manifested in sameness of reaction 
to substance characteristics. There are two types of properties that we call determinables 
and determinates [73], where determinables can be thought as slots that collect 
determinates. Thus, for instance, colour is a determinable which is used to collect 
                                                
14 Throughout the chapter we write cat meaning Felis catus. 
15 To distinguish between substance concepts and substances we write the former in “quotes”. 
Thus for instance, “cat” is an example of substance concept which corresponds to the substance 
cat. 
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determinates such as blue, red, or yellow. From a biological point of view, determinable 
properties correspond to the use of neurons located in certain early sensory areas of the 
brain (e.g., colour is tuned to neurons in visual cortex) while, on the other hand, determinate 
properties (e.g., red) would represent single states produced as a reaction to perception 
(e.g., a red stimulus) [63]. 
3.2. Kinds of Substance Concepts 
There are two types of substances and, correspondingly, two types of substance concepts, 
namely individuals and real kinds. Individuals are single units, scattered in space, enduring 
through time. In language, individuals are usually revealed by the use of proper nouns or 
definite descriptions. Examples of named individuals are Barack Obama, my cat Garfield 
and the Empire State Building. On the other hand, we usually think of real kinds as clusters 
of elements, what we usually call the real kind members, which are characterized by a 
common, empirically observable, connection grounded in some, most often natural, law. 
Real kinds “... allow successful inductions to be made from one or a few members to other 
members of the kind not by accident” [72]. Examples of real kinds are: stuff, e.g., gold or 
water, biological species, e.g., cat and Quercus Alba, artefacts, e.g., chair and car, and also 
social roles, e.g., doctor and father. The members of real kinds, what we perceive as a 
“generic” chair or cat, are substances as well. 
 
A first observation relates to the statement that real kinds, their members and individuals 
are all substances, a statement which is somewhat counter-intuitive for anybody working 
in KR. For someone coming from this field, the most obvious way to think of the world is 
to map real kinds to classes and individuals to instances which, in turn, are members of 
classes. This mapping is discussed in detail in Section 5 below. Here it is worthwhile 
noticing that with substance concepts we focus on recognition, modelled as an ability. In 
this respect, both individuals and real kinds share the property that, during an encounter, 
they are only partially perceived by PCSs. In the same way as we always perceive only one 
or a few members of a kind, we always get only a partial view of an individual (e.g., the 
back or the front). The best way to understand this commonality is to think of substances, 
no matter whether they are individuals or real kinds, as wholes which are only partially 
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presented, with some of their parts, by their manifestations to a PCS. In perception there 
are neither sets nor instances, there are only wholes (substances) that are perceived only 
partially. There is however a key difference between real kinds and individuals which is at 
the basis of the KR representation of the world in terms of classes and instances. Real kinds 
have the property, not possessed by individuals, of being in multiple places at the same 
time, meaning by this the fact that any kind can have, at the same time, multiple 
occurrences inside one or more (contemporary) encounters. This property, clearly, does 
not hold for individuals: a PCS will perceive at most one individual as part of the same 
encounter. Thus, for instance, I can perceive two cats together on top of the wall in front 
of me, but I can only perceive (at most) one occurrence of Garfield per encounter. 
 
A second observation relates to the fact that the inductive grounding that allows the 
recognition of the same real kind across encounters is very much the same as for 
individuals. The key observation is that a real kind manifests itself through its members. 
Both in the case of individuals and of real kinds, the PCS is faced, in time, with similar 
characteristics that allow a substance to be recognized as being the same from a previous 
encounter. Thus, for instance, the members of the real kind cat, what we usually call cats, 
like all species, possess a certain set of common properties (e.g., similar shape and weight) 
and, consequently, often look similar. Analogously, Garfield, like all individuals, looks 
pretty much the same across encounters. The ability of substances to manifest some form 
of invariance through multiple encounters is grounded in their causal factor, as defined 
above. But the nature of this causal factor is very different between real kinds and 
individuals. In the first case it consists of some causal connection that is shared by all 
members of a real kind while in the second case it is related to the fact that the same 
individual usually changes slowly in time.  
 
The third observation relates to the process by which substances get recognized through 
substance concepts. This observation is also crucial to understand the distinction between 
individuals and members of a real kind, a distinction that in KR is blurred into the notion 
of instance. This distinction is, again, deeply rooted in the profound difference which exists 
between recognition and classification. Consider for instance an encounter with Garfield. 
What will the PCS recognize: the individual Garfield or the (member of the) real kind cat, 
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what we usually call “a cat”? We have the first case when recognition happens via the 
individual substance concept, the second case when the real kind substance concept is 
enabled. The “selection” of the substance concept is related to the substance properties 
being recognized. This process is not univocal and depends on many factors. The most 
important seems to be the actual goal of the PCS (is it looking for Garfield because it wants 
to feed it or is it just trying to avoid hitting a cat running in front of the car?), but it also 
depends on the context (e.g., it is harder to recognize an individual at night), on which 
characteristics are manifested and/or grasped (it is harder to recognize an individual from 
the back) and so on. Notice that the recognition of Garfield will most likely exploit different 
characteristics from those used in the recognition of a cat. In the first case, the PCS will 
exploit those characteristics that uniquely identify Garfield among the other cats, while in 
the second case it will exploit those characteristics that uniquely identify cats among the 
other animals. These two sets of characteristics overlap only partially.  
 
The fourth and last observation is that the same substance changes over different 
encounters thus presenting a set of continuously evolving characteristics. Thus, for 
instance, two encounters with the real kind cat may produce very different manifestations, 
though looking similar to two other manifestations which in turn look similar to two other 
manifestations which …, eventually, will look similar. As a paradigmatic example, under 
what conditions a person is (recognized as being) the same person as 30 years ago? If I 
meet a person after 30 years, most likely I will not recognize her as being the same 
individual. Dually, with an individual with no salient distinguishing marks, there is a high 
probability to fail its recognition over encounters. Think for instance of forks. In this case 
what usually happens is that only the real kind fork is recognized as there is no interest in 
distinguishing among the various individuals. We just look for any fork. This of course 
will not be the case with that specific fork that I was playing with when I was a kid. 
3.3. Kinds of Real Kinds 
Real kinds can be further divided into two more specific categories, i.e., eternal kinds and 
historical kinds.  
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Eternal kinds correspond to what is often called stuff, e.g., “gold” and “water”. The 
members of eternal kinds share some fundamental characteristics without being historically 
related to one another. This inner structure remains stable over time without exceptions. 
Eternal kinds are often expressed through their mass and/or atomic number, are named 
using uncountable nouns and are said to have “essences” in a very classical sense, i.e., 
essences that can be discovered through empirical investigation.  
 
Historical kinds are real kinds “… for which historical location does play a role in 
explaining likeness” [72]. Examples of historical kinds are species, artefacts and social 
roles, e.g., “doctor” and “baker”. Historical kinds are named in this way because their 
members bear a certain common relation which has evolved in time. For instance, consider 
species. All their members have a connection with some prior member from which they 
derive their characteristics. Similarly, all artefacts can be seen as being derived from some 
prior member, i.e., a prototype, a model of a chair. Finally, younger doctors learn how to 
act from older doctors.  
 
Historical kinds are strongly correlated and, for what we have figured out so far, include 
as sub-kinds what the psychologist Eleanor Rosch calls basic level categories (and 
objects). These are the concepts that children learn first and use to categorize the world. 
They are the easiest to recognize via sensory (e.g., visual) and motor interaction with 
substances. Basic level categories can be detected by running experiment(s) like the one 
described in [90]. As shown in this experiment, in a hierarchy (a classification) of 
categories, basic level categories maximize the number of characteristics shared by their 
members and minimize the number of characteristics shared with the members of their 
sibling categories. A further characterization of basic level categories is that, usually, the 
members of their superordinate categories share a very small number of characteristics 
while the members of their subordinate categories, usually, share a large number of 
characteristics that, however, are shared also by the members of the sibling categories. The 
consequence is that the members of basic level categories have a much higher probability 
of successful recognition than the members of their superordinate or subordinate 
categories. Recognizing a cat, for instance, is much easier than recognizing an animal or a 
Siamese cat. In other words, basic level categories provide the ideal balance between the 
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similarity of their members and the dissimilarity of the members of their sibling categories. 
One interesting observation is that, contrarily to what was initially expected by 
anthropological and linguistic researchers, biological basic level objects are at the level of 
abstraction of species, namely one level up from the level of abstraction of the basic level 
objects which are artefacts (e.g., furniture, as from the experiment by Rosch). 
 
Following Rosch we can further distinguish basic level categories, namely historical kinds, 
into biological and non-biological basic kinds. The former are the basic units of biological 
classification, i.e., biological species, while the latter are defined as the complement of the 
former and are therefore not well characterized. Examples of non-biological basic kinds, 
are artefacts like “car” or “chair” (subsumed by superordinate categories like vehicle and 
furniture, respectively) or social roles like “doctor” and “baker”. 
3.4. Classification and Recognition 
In KR, the main focus so far has been on classification more than on recognition. As a 
result, knowledge is modelled in terms of instances (e.g., Garfield), concepts (e.g., cat), 
namely sets of instances and properties defined as the Cartesian product of two classes, 
e.g., being of colour yellow, being near something). Concepts are associated to sets of 
properties and the values of the latter allow to make distinctions among the members of 
the former. We call below this kind of concepts, classification concepts, or simply classes, 
to distinguish them from substance concepts. We also talk of classification properties when 
we need to distinguish them from substance properties.  
 
The mapping between the work and notions defined in this chapter and these notions 
coming from KR can be established based on the following steps: 
 
a) We think of classification as the ability of organizing instances into classes as a 
function of their properties. This is the ability that generates and manipulates classes, 
classification properties and instances as representations of the world. 
b) With an overloading of the terms, we talk of substance concepts and substance 
properties meaning not only the corresponding functions and abilities but also the 
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representations generated by such functions, and dually for classification concepts. This 
allows to eliminate the difference in approach between us and the “usual” KR approach. 
For both classification and recognition, we distinguish among devices, abilities, 
functions and representations only when needed. 
c) We acknowledge that recognition and classification are two distinct abilities which 
generate and manipulate distinct representations of the world, the first being a 
perception-oriented representation the second being a semantic language-oriented 
representation of the world. This implies that classes and substance concepts, 
classification properties and substance properties, instances and individuals are actually 
distinct representations. It is important to notice that this assumption is coherent with 
the most recent discoveries in neuroscience which provide evidence that perception and 
“semantic” oriented representations are actually stored in two different parts of the 
brain [65].  
 
As a result of these assumptions we are now in the condition of studying the pair-wise 
similarities between the recognition and classification representations of the world. The 
existence of these similarities is the obvious consequence of the fact that substance 
concepts and classification concepts are both representations of substances. However, this 
mapping is far less obvious than one would expect, the motivation being rooted in the very 
nature of the functions of recognition and classification. Substance concepts allow to 
recognize substances over encounters and to acquire knowledge about them, while 
classification concepts allow to group together substances about which we already have 
some knowledge. Thus the former are representations of sets of occurrences of substances, 
while the latter are representations of sets of substances. With substance concepts we 
describe substances over time, while with classification concepts we describe substances 
in time. Similarly, individuals are representations of sets of occurrences of substances, 
while instances are representations of (single) substances. This generates various crucial 
distinctions.  
 
Let us start from individuals. An individual is a set of occurrences of the same substance 
and, as such, it can be mapped to the single instance representing that substance. A crucial 
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difference is that individual substance concepts need not have names. Names play no role 
in the recognition process, while they are crucial in the deployment of classification 
abilities: you need an identifier to be able to refer to an instance, this is a prerequisite to 
classification. Furthermore, the mapping individual – instance is not one-to-one. Thus, I 
can have two or more individuals for the same instance because I did not recognize them 
as being (sets of) manifestations of the same substance, e.g., myself at the age of five and 
the age of fifty, or myself dressed as Santa Claus and being recognized as such. The 
contrary, namely having two or more instances for the same individual, seems to be the 
case only when there is a need to reason about occurrences of individuals in different 
moments in time, e.g., because reasoning of the color of my hair at the age of five and at 
the age of fifty. Furthermore, I can have an instance which does not correspond to an 
individual, e.g., the Minotaur, because it is a product of the mind with no existence in the 
real world, or Homer who I have never seen in person or described in any form; but I can 
also have an individual which is not an instance, e.g., a specific part of the mountain I see 
every day from the window of my office. I look at this view every day, I love it but I do 
not need to name it because there is no need for me to classify it and reason about it. 
 
Real kinds can be mapped to classes. Classes are sets of instances where real kinds group 
sets of encounters, one set per instance. Again, as in the case of individuals, and for the 
same reason, real kinds and their members need not have names. It is interesting to notice 
that in natural language, when we speak of a member of a real kind, e.g., “cat”, we speak 
of a cat meaning a generic cat while we speak of Garfield meaning the specific individual. 
And the kind of mental image and reasoning that is performed in the two situations is 
usually different. In most cases we have a one-to-one mapping between a class and a real 
kind. However, as for individuals, this mapping presents lots of exceptions. Thus we may 
have a real kind with no corresponding class, similarly to what happens for individuals. 
We may also have a class with no corresponding real kind. Following Millikan, we call 
these types of classes, Nominal Kinds or simply, Nominals. Nominals are sets of instances 
which do not share a causal factor but that, rather, are grouped together according to a 
definition provided in terms of the set of properties they share. 
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With nominals we have two possible situations. In the first case we have one nominal kind 
that can be mapped to two or more real kinds. This situation arises with concepts like 
“stone” or “animal”. Thus, “animal” can be thought as the union of the real kinds “cat”, 
“dog”, “lion”, and so on. With stones, for instance we may focus on their shape, weight, 
composition and so forth. These types of nominal kinds are concepts that are high in the 
abstraction hierarchy and are very useful to classify and organize real kinds. But this 
conventional, theory driven, characterization of stones has nothing to do with the rich, 
recognition driven substance concepts. When I say “animal” which image of which animal 
should come to my mind? A cat, a crocodile, or …? In the second case we have a real kind 
that can be mapped to two or more classes. This situation arises any time we distinguish 
among the members of a real kind by assigning them some specific property. Thus, for 
instance, “cat” can be thought as the union of “white cat”, “black cat”, and so on.   
 
If we concentrate on the mapping between substance properties and classification 
properties we have pretty much the same situation as for instances and real kinds. Even if 
some mapping exists, it is not one-to-one and it presents various exceptions. Thus, for 
instance, as from [63], the (substance) properties that we use in recognition are often quite 
different, and much more complex from the classification properties we use to describe 
substances. There is also a further interesting twist. While most classification properties 
map to substance properties, this turns out not to be the case for social roles. Social roles 
are real kinds that in KR are modelled as properties. Social roles are real kinds as a 
consequence of the fact that their members, e.g., doctors, manifest similar behaviours. No 
matter the concrete individual who is playing the role of doctor, given a certain situation, 
her activities will be similar to those of other doctors, as they would be needed to carry out 
their duty. 
3.5. An ontology of (Recognition) Abilities 
Figure 1 introduces RAO, for Ontology of (Recognition) Abilities, a very early version of 
an ontology which organizes the notions introduced above. RAO must be understood as 
follows. As from the root, we concentrate on substance concepts taking them to be abilities 
as well as the representations generated by these abilities. Nominal kinds are added (in 
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dashed lines) for completeness meaning by this that they can be thought as extreme cases 
of substance concepts with no recognition ability.  
 
Fig. 2. The RAO ontology. 
The structure of RAO is motivated by causal factors, as defined in the rest of this section. 
Thus, with individuals we have the following: 
 
a) A natural conservation law. Individuals have the ability to preserve their properties 
from day to day [72]. Take for instance a person. If she has brown eyes, is tall, is a good 
tennis player and knowledgeable about informatics, it is likely that she will have these 
same traits also tomorrow. A similar argument applies to the other kinds of individuals, 
e.g., to artefacts. 
 
It is important to observe that the causal factor of individuals works very much in the same 
way as the physics law of the conservation of energy.  
 
The members of real kinds share an empirically observable connection grounded in some 
law. Real kinds are taken to be the union of historical kinds and eternal kinds. The 
connections characterizing historical kinds are provided by the possession of one or more 
of the following four causal factors:  
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b) Being the result of a copying activity. In this case, historical kinds share determinate 
properties because of some form of previous “copying” activity. We say that a 
substance B is a “copy” of a substance A, or that B is modelled on A, or that B is a 
reproduction of A. B can be a true copy of A, as in the case of genes and viruses. B can 
also be an indirect copy of A resulting from a wider reproduction process. Thus for 
instance the heart of a person is an indirect reproduction of the heart of her parents 
while an artefact is another form of indirect reproduction from some abstract model. 
c) A function. In this case, historical kinds are associated with a function which defines 
their purpose. This property is possessed in particular by artefacts, and its concrete 
appearance is often influenced by the cultural context [72]. Chairs for instance are 
defined by the function of allowing people to sit on them, and Japanese chairs are very 
different from European chairs. Social roles, e.g. mother, are examples of human 
functions. 
d) A similar training. In this case, historical kinds are living beings, e.g., persons, who 
have characteristics or skills that are transferred across generations through training. 
Example kinds are socially constructed substances such as roles, e.g., doctors and 
bakers. 
e) A homeostatic mechanism. For instance, the members of biological species can be seen 
as “… homeostatic systems […] amazingly well-buffered to resist change and maintain 
stability in the face of disturbing influences” [70]. The key observation here is that, 
despite having many different properties, the members of a species remain stable and 
relatively similar in time (e.g., adult weight, internal temperature and so forth). This is 
because species evolve as a result of continuous adaptation and, at the same time, of 
the necessity for the various genes in a gene pool to be compatible with one another.   
 
The members of biological basic kinds possess factors (b) and (e) while the members of 
historical kinds that are held together according to (b) or (c) or (d), or their combination, 
can be grouped in the catch-all category of non-biological kinds.  
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Finally, eternal kinds can be characterized by the following causal factors: 
 
f) An inner structure or a single underlying cause. Eternal kinds have a sort of real essence 
that can be discovered by empirical investigation.   
 
Notice that the above list of properties, and therefore RAO, is neither claimed to be final 
nor complete. It is a first characterization that organizes the state of the art and which can 
be further extended. Among others, an open research issue is whether non-biological kinds 
can be divided into more fine-grained categories according to some specific applications 
of (b), (c) or (d). For instance, a possible subordinate category of non-biological kinds 
could be the “artefact kind”, whose members are alike due to a special case of (b), which 
should be applied in a non-biological sense and (c), applied as in the chair example above.  
3.6. From classification abilities to recognition abilities – a case study 
Starting from RAO it is possible to devise the beginning of a methodology for identifying 
which classification concepts from existing ontologies correspond to substance concepts. 
In this section we show how this can be done by mapping RAO to the light version of 
DOLCE16, i.e., DOLCE-Lite, and to the PIZZA domain ontology17. DOLCE-Lite provides 
a large repertoire of very abstract concepts while the PIZZA ontology classifies more 
concrete concepts. The resulting mapping is depicted in Figure 2 below.  
                                                
16 http://www.loa.istc.cnr.it/old/DOLCE.html 
17 http://protege.stanford.edu/ontologies/pizza/pizza.owl 
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Fig. 3. Mapping RAO to DOLCE and the PIZZA Ontology. 
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Due to lack of space we have reported our results only for the first three levels of the input 
ontologies. The RAO concepts are identified with boxes (kinds/individual) and ellipses 
(properties). dol:, piz:, rao:, stand for concepts coming from DOLCE, PIZZA and 
RAO, respectively. The underlined terms denote classes which are not mapped. Dashed 
edges denote the mapping, where two arrows mean equivalence and one arrow means 
subsumption. 
 
Focusing on DOLCE-Lite, 36% of its classes are mapped to RAO. Two classes are mapped 
with an equivalence relation. The first is dol:PhysicalEndurant, which is mapped 
with rao:RealKind, the second is dol:Quality, which, according to our current 
understanding, maps to rao:determinable category. 28% of the DOLCE classes 
(78% of all the mapped classes) are mapped to rao:NominalKind via a subsumption 
relation. As an example of the kind of reasoning which motivates the mapping with 
nominal kinds, consider the dol:SpatioTemporalParticular class, (Figure 2), 
which is labelled as nominal. The reason for this choice is that the class “spatio-temporal 
particular”, as from DOLCE-Lite, is a “dummy class for optimizing some property 
universes”. Here we may find concepts such as endurants (i.e., dol: Endurant), 
perdurants (i.e., dol:Perdurant) and physical realizations (i.e., 
dol:PhysicalRealization), which  cannot be grounded in a causal factor.  
 
85% of the PIZZA ontology classes are successfully mapped, resulting in eleven 
subsumption relations. For instance, piz:hot and piz:mild are subsumed by 
rao:determinate. These concepts map well to our definition of determinate. They are 
distinguishable because of a set of common features (in this case, features related to 
spiciness, i.e., piz:spiciness, which perfectly map to rao:determinable). 
Similarly, classes like piz:Pizza and piz:IceCream are subsumed by 
rao:NonBiologicalBasicKind. In fact, if, as from the experiment by Rosch, 
piz:Food is a nominal, pizzas are artefacts grounded in a “copying” causal factor. 38,5% 
of “pizza” ontology classes (45,5% of all the mapped classes) are mapped to nominal kinds 
via subsumption. These classes are clear examples of conventionally defined, theory 
driven, groupings (e.g., piz:Value-partition).  
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This exercise provides the highlights of a general methodology for identifying substance 
concepts. At the same time, it also provides evidence of the fact that there is a need to 
further refine RAO: 64% of the concepts from DOLCE-Lite and 15% of the concepts from 
the PIZZA ontology are unmapped. Let us consider some examples. For instance, 
following Millikan’s suggestion that events are substance concepts, the classification 
concept dol:Perdurant, should be mapped to a new recognition ability. As another 
example, the concept dol:Endurant and its more specific concepts should be linked to 
RAO through several more classes which are more specific than the ones we have provided 
so far. For instance, dol:AmountOfMatter, is a dol:PhysicalEndurant which 
can be successfully mapped to what Millikan would call “stuff”, i.e., a kind of 
rao:EternalKind. A further issue is whether quality spaces, as defined in DOLCE, 
can be used as kind of “determination dimensions” and whether they can be employed to 
guide the linking between determinables and determinates. This analysis is essential to 
explore the relation between the concept of “determinate” and the concept of “quale” thus 
providing a contribution to the modelling of properties [82].  All these examples define a 
path of research that will allow us to provide a clear mapping of how, in practice, we could 
deploy concepts which implement a recognition function, a classification function, or both 
in an integrated manner. 
3.7. Implications on AI systems 
The differences between substance concepts and classification concepts highlighted above 
provide interesting insights on how to build integrated AI perception and reasoning 
systems. The general question is which concepts should be selected for artificial 
recognition (e.g., vision, sensory) systems and how we should treat them in relation to the 
classification concepts which are represented inside KR systems, for instance as elements 
of ontologies. How to create a mapping between these two kinds of concepts is a very well-
known open problem, i.e. the semantic gap problem, which has been solved only in very 
particular situations [62]. 
 
From the point of view of recognition, substance concepts are the ones where most efforts 
should be concentrated, as they are the concepts that, thanks to the causal factor in which 
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they are grounded, have a more immediate mapping with their appearance. Thus for 
instance, the recognition of cats and dogs from a set of pictures will need to handle less 
diversity than the recognition of animals. Dually, the function of classification is very 
valuable and worthwhile with nominals, not only because it allows to organize substance 
concepts (thus delegating them the recognition function) but also because the definitions 
of nominals are very stable, with essentially no exceptions. These definitions can in fact be 
provided as sets of properties with no need to map with the complexity and infinite variety 
of the real world. Animals, for instance, are best defined and thought of as cats or dogs or 
…, without trying to recognize them in terms of the sensory input.  
 
A further interesting situation arises when there is a need to recognize some specific sub-
kinds of real kinds, for instance when we need to distinguish cats by their color. This type 
of categorization turns out to be useful in substance recognition from sensors as it allows 
to apply to recognition the compositionality of meaning which is intrinsic in knowledge 
representation. The work described in [103] is a rather successful experiment in this 
direction. We are aware of the consequences of what discussed by Millikan in her critique 
to Fodor [70], namely that the compositionality of properties in KR may not correspond to 
the compositionality of properties in recognition. Thus, even if I know how to recognize a 
person and how to recognize a hat I may fail to recognize that very same person wearing 
that very same hat. However, our early attempts to apply compositionality to recognition 
hold a lot of promise, the main reason being that they exponentially decrease the cost of 
training of the learning components [103]. 
 
The big challenge is how to manage and reason about those substances for which we have 
both classes and substance concepts. The problem is that the static definition of classes 
does not fit well with the variance of appearance of their substances, and therefore, with 
the corresponding variability of substance concepts. A long discussion on this issue 
leading, among other things, to the distinction between conception and concept can be 
found in [75]. As a small example, it is essentially impossible to provide a definition of 
what the real kind “cat” is, as what makes a cat “a cat” is its causal factor while its apparent 
characteristics change in time. A discussion of this issue is out of the scope of this chapter. 
Our general approach, which will be the topic of a follow-up work, is that the (substance) 
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properties which are chosen when defining, e.g., the class “cat”, should not be fixed a priori 
but, rather, should be adapted at run time as a function of the goal which the definition 
must serve, for instance the alignment with what is being recognized by a vision system.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4. Teleologies: Objects, Actions and Functions 
A crucial characteristic of humans is their ability to build and exploit representations of 
what they perceive, what we usually call the world. Such representations usually consist of 
complex combinations of concepts, where we take a concept to be an abstract idea 
generalized from particular instances. However, the very notion of concept is controversial 
[40]. Thus, for instance, on one side we have the Biosemantics approach which takes a 
concept to be a device and a representation supporting certain biological processes, in 
particular, perception (e.g, human vision) [87], while, on the other side, we have the so-
called Descriptionist approach which takes a concept to be a class, namely a set of instances 
characterized by some shared set of properties, as the basic construct enabling knowledge 
representation, classification and reasoning. The former and latter notions of concept 
underlie the work in Computer Vision (CV) [35] and in Knowledge Representation (KR) 
[102], respectively.  
 
The work desribed in the previous chapter shows how the two notions above have different 
characteristics and calls them substance concepts and classification concepts, respectively. 
Substance concepts represent what we perceive and, therefore, are characterized by a 
notion of perceptual identity (and diversity) while classification concepts represent what 
we reason about and, therefore, are characterized by a notion of reasoning identity (and 
diversity). While perceptual identity captures invariance over the occurrences of what we 
perceive, reasoning identity captures invariance over the occurrences of what we reason 
about. Thus, for instance, we recognize a rock as being such depending on what we 
perceive, while we reason about the same rock as an obstacle when it is in our way, or as 
a kind of weapon when throwing it at someone.  
 
In this chapter we show how to integrate substance and classification concepts into a 
hierarchy of increasing abstraction from what is perceived. Thus, at the first level, we have 
objects (which roughly correspond to substance concepts), which are representations of 
what is perceived (e.g., a car); at the second level we have actions, which represent how 
  55 
objects change in time (e.g., move, where, among others, cars can move); while, at the third 
level, we have functions (which roughly correspond to classification concepts), which 
represent the expected behavior of objects as it is manifested in terms of “an object 
performing a certain set of actions” (e.g., a vehicle, where vehicles, e.g., cars, can perform 
many actions, e.g., move and stop). The intuition is that, by performing actions, objects 
interfere with other objects, this being the basic mechanism by which the world evolves. 
In this perspective, functions model the expected interference among objects. Object 
interference, and therefore function, is captured via the notions of producer and consumer, 
where an object is a producer when it performs an action affecting another object and a 
consumer when it is affected by it.  
 
The patterns by which producers affect consumers provide the basis for the construction of 
Teleologies.18 Ontologies19 are defined as explicit formal specifications of the terms in a 
domain [45]. The same definition can be applied for teleologies but with the proviso that 
teleologies focus on function and on how a chosen representation fits a certain purpose, 
this being the basis for a general model for the diversity of knowledge [44]. In this respect, 
the distinction between objects and their multiple functions is the first source of 
heterogeneity, modeling the diversity between the representation of what we perceive and 
the representation of what we reason about. The second source of heterogeneity is our 
ability to represent and reason about what we perceive at different levels of abstraction, as 
function of the problem to be solved. Thus, for instance, I can describe a person as moving 
her legs, as walking, or as moving, depending on my focus.  
 
This work is a first step towards a solution to the problem of managing knowledge diversity 
not in the sense that we are able to define the ultimate teleology which can be reused in 
general (which is impossible) but, rather, in the sense that we provide the basis for a general 
methodology for the construction, integration and/or adaptation of data and knowledge 
coming from multiple heterogeneous sources. We organize the chapter as follows. In 
                                                
18 The word teleology builds on the Greek words telos (meaning “end, purpose”) and logia, 
(meaning “a branch of learning”). 
19 The word ontology builds on the Greek words ont (meaning “being”) and logia, (meaning “a 
branch of learning”). 
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Section 4.1, we introduce objects, actions and functions. In Section 4.2 we introduce 
producers, consumers and producer – consumer (PC) patterns. In Section 4.3 we introduce 
the three PC pattern transformations which can be used to reduce one pattern to another 
pattern, preserving the pattern intended meaning. In Section 4.4, we provide a small 
example of how to build and how to adapt a teleology, using the pattern transformations 
from Section 4.4, adaptation being they key for handling diversity in knowledge. Finally, 
in Section 4.5, we provide the related work. 
 
4.1. Object, Action and Function 
We live immersed in a spatio-temporal continuum where space and time are the a-priori 
forms of perception [10]. We do not perceive space or time, but anything we perceive is 
part of a precise spatial or temporal ordering, and fills it. We perceive these parts through 
encounters, namely events during which such parts manifest themselves to an observer. 
We call such parts, substances, where, as from [75], “… substances are those things about 
which you can learn from one encounter something of what to expect on other encounters, 
where this is no accident but the result of a real connection”.  
 
People represent substances as concepts. However, the mapping between substances and 
concepts is not one-to-one. Thus, I may perceive a substance as a cat that I am trying to 
avoid hitting, as my cat, as an animal, or as an obstacle. Even more, there are substances 
for which we do not have a concept. One such example, the part of the mountain that I can 
see from the window of my office. Concepts represent those parts of the spatio-temporal 
continuum that are relevant to us, in the way which is most convenient for us,20 as the world 
where we live.21 But if the world, as we perceive it, is representation, and if there is a certain 
degree of freedom in what we represent and in how we represent it, is there a general 
principle to which we all adhere and that allows us to live in the same world, or at least in 
worlds which are very similar?  
                                                
20 The concepts we use are also largely influenced by our language, culture, history, place where 
we live, and many other contextual factors. 
21 Interestingly enough, the ancient Latin word for world is mundus, meaning “clean, elegant”, 
itself a translation of the Greek word cosmos, meaning “orderly arrangement”. 
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Fig. 4. Object, Action and Function.  
 
Our answer to the above questions is based on a distinction among three types of concepts, 
namely objects, actions, and functions, which represent what is perceived, across 
encounters, at increasing levels of abstraction (see Figure 1). 
 
We take Objects to be those concepts which represent substances, i.e., what is perceived 
across encounters. Examples of objects are: cats, cars, rivers. As from described in the 
previous chapter, an object can be thought as the set of all of the representations of how 
the same substance “fills” space, any time we encounter it. Objects can be individuals (what 
in KR we call instances, e.g., my cat Garfield) or kinds (i.e., generic instances of what in 
KR we call classes, e.g., any cat that I can encounter while walking). Objects are first level 
abstract representations in the sense that they abstract over multiple occurrences of the 
same substance (as recognized during encounters) and collect them in clusters (one cluster 
per object). An object, e.g., “a cat”, is nothing else but the set of representations of all the 
times we have perceived (e.g., seen) it. 
 
We take Actions to be those concepts which represent how objects change in time. 
Examples of actions are: running (performed by, e.g., cats), carrying (performed by, e.g., 
cars) and flowing (performed by, e.g., rivers). As with objects, actions are generated any 
time we encounter a substance. Actions are second level abstract representations in the 
sense that they abstract over multiple occurrences of changes in time of a substance (as 
recognized during encounters) and collect them in clusters (one cluster per action). An 
action, e.g., “running”, is taken to be the set of representations of all times we have 
perceived a running object, e.g., “a cat” (or “a dog”), where the representation of “a running 
cat” or (“a running dog”), is a temporal sequence of “cat” (“dog”) occurrences. Notice how 
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actions are independent of the specific object carrying them out; objects are abstracted 
away to keep track only of what changes. 
 
We say that a certain object O performs a certain action A when we perceive O subject to 
the change described by A. Notice that there are only so many actions that can be performed 
by an object. For instance a car cannot be used to fly. We capture this intuition by saying 
that any object O is associated to a set of admissible actions {A}a:O, where A is an action 
and “a:O” stands for “admissible for O”. We have the following: 
 
AaO(O) = {A | for any A ∈{A}a:O} 
OaA(A) = {O | for any O such that A ∈{A}a:O} 
 
where AaO and OaA are to be read, respectively, (admissible) Actions of (Object) and 
Objects of (admissible Action). Thus, for instance we have AaO(car)  = {move, transport, 
trap, …} and OaA(move) = {car, bus, person, table, …}. For any object, its set of 
admissible actions, as well as its set of not admissible (inadmissible) actions, is infinite, as 
infinite are the ways in which an object can evolve in time. At the same time, an admissible 
action can be performed only under certain contextual conditions. For instance, a car needs 
gas to run its engine and move around. Admissible actions are similar in spirit to Millikan’s 
abilities and somewhat related to the notion of affordance, as formalized by Gibson [39] 
and then taken up in various contexts, see, e.g., [94], [82]. The crucial difference is that 
affordances are related to what an environment enables an object to do, more than what an 
object is, by itself, able to do.  
 
Certain admissible actions occur quite rarely. For instance, a car can be used as a trap for 
certain animals, but this is rather unusual. Many admissible actions are instead quite 
common. Thus for instance, a car usually moves around and transports people, while a 
person usually eats, sleeps and walks. Similarly, at school, quite often an older person (that 
we call “a teacher”) explains some topic to a younger person (that we call “a student”), she 
gives homework, she grades it, and so on. The fact that certain sets of actions are repeatedly 
performed by the same object allows humans to make predictions about the future 
  59 
behaviour of objects and to reason about this. We formalize this fact through the notion of 
function. The function of an object formalizes the behavior that an object is expected to 
have. This expected behavior may be due to the object’s purpose (as it is the case with 
artifacts, e.g., a car) or to its role, for instance in the world and society (as it is the case 
with living organisms, e.g., a cat, a tree or a person). Sometimes the word used to denote a 
function is the same used to denote the object performing it (e.g., car, cat); in many cases 
language provides dedicated words (e.g., teacher, parent) possibly with a negative 
connotation (e.g., obstacle, enemy, garbage).  
 
We capture this intuition by saying that an object can perform one or more functions, where 
a function is defined as a set of actions. Let O be an object and {FO}p:O  a set of proper 
functions FO (where proper emphasizes the fact that these are functions which are 
“expected”). Then we have the following (“p:O/p:FO” stands for “proper for O/FO”): 
 
FpO(O) = {FO | for any FO ∈ {FO}p:O} 
OpF(FO) = {O | for any O such that FO ∈{FO}p:O} 
 
with: 
 
ApF(FO) = {A | for any A ∈{A}p:Fo} 
FpA(A) = {FO | for any FO such that A ∈{A}p:Fo} 
 
where: FpO and OpF are to be read (proper) Functions of (Object) and Objects of (proper) 
Function, respectively, and ApF and FpA are to be read (proper) Actions of (Function) and 
Functions of (proper Action), respectively. Thus, for instance, we have ApF(vehicle) = 
{move, transport, …} and FpA(move) = {vehicle, person, …}. Obviously, {A}p:Fo 
⊂{A}a:O. {FO}p:O is assumed to be finite. The finiteness of {FO}p:O, in the case of artifacts 
follows from the fact that we build artifacts with a specific purpose in mind. The finite 
functionality of living beings is not connected to the fact that we know their purpose but to 
the fact that they have shape and behavior which comes from nature and is replicated 
through reproduction, and from the fact that we model it as their role. It is a fact that (the 
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functions of) living beings are more easily recognized and perceived than (those of) 
artifacts [90]. At the same time, ApF(FO) contains (again) a possibly infinite number of 
actions, this meaning, in practice, that there is always the possibility to characterize a 
specific change of an object/function as a new action. If language allows us to precisely 
denote an object or a function with a word, a precise characterization in terms of its possible 
actions is impossible. 
 
As from Figure 1, functions are third level abstract representations in the sense that they 
abstract over multiple occurrences of objects performing actions (as recognized during 
encounters) and collect them in clusters (one cluster per function). A function, e.g., 
“mover”, consists of the set of representations of all the times we have perceived an object 
performing a certain expected action, e.g., “a running cat” or “a walking person”.  
4.2. Producer – Consumer Patterns 
We model the interaction between objects, actions and functions using patterns like the one 
in Figure 2. More precisely, the pattern in Figure 2, is a specific instance of what we call 
an OAO (for Object-Action-Object) pattern. In OAO patterns, round boxes represent 
objects, arrow boxes represent actions and square boxes represent functions. t1 and t2 define 
start and end of the action. The specific pattern in Figure 2 instantiates what in natural 
language we would describe as ‘a car transporting a person’. In Figure 2, Transport is the 
action, Car is the producer object, Person is the consumer object, Vehicle is the function 
performed by the producer while Passenger is the function performed by the consumer. 
The intuition is that an object plays the function of a producer when it performs an action 
affecting another object, possibly itself, and that the function of consumer is played by the 
object being affected by this action. The intuition of what “an action affecting another 
object” means is that an object is associated with a state and that this state changes any 
time an object is a consumer. The state of an object includes its physical properties (e.g., 
position, shape, beauty), the actions it performs (a subset of the set AaO(O)), namely the 
patterns where it is a producer and the state of its functions (being, e.g., active, idle, 
malfunctioning, sick, in love, angry, …). 
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Fig. 5. ‘OAO pattern – A car transporting a person’. 
 
In Figure 2, the arrows from/to objects represent two crucial aspects of the model: 
 
1. an object is always both a producer and a consumer, being embedded in the 
continuous evolution of the world;  
2. an object may occur in multiple OAO patterns while an action may occur only inside 
a single OAO pattern. 
 
OAO patterns have the form of the pattern in Figure 2 with three possible variations: (i) 
producer and consumer may be dropped when the relevant concept is not lexicalized or it 
is lexicalized with the same term as the object, (ii) the producer and the consumer may be 
the same object (as in, e.g., “a person walking”), in which case the pattern forms a cycle, 
and (iii) the action may be in passive form (as in, e.g., “a person transported by a car”), 
this being useful to compose OAO patterns, as described below. 
4.3. Basic Patterns 
OAO patterns model the world evolution. Clearly there are infinitely many such patterns. 
However, that there are only four primitive OAO patterns and corresponding primitive 
functions, which model the world evolution basic modalities. These patterns model (i) how 
new objects are conceived, (ii) how they are realized and (iii) how they are destroyed, and 
(iv) how they affect the state of other objects. The first such pattern, called Conception, or 
OCO pattern, defines the function conceiver. See Figure 3.  
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Fig. 6. ‘OCO - Object conception pattern’. 
 
Conception represents the process by which a concept, which was not lexicalized before, 
is conceived. Concept conception amounts not only to the creation of the new concept in 
the mind of a living being, e.g., a person, but also to the creation, via perception, of the 
causal relation between the concept and the substance being perceived. For instance, 
Johannes Gutenberg in 1439 conceived the first printing press. Notice that living beings 
are the only objects which can conceive new functions and that they do this by reflexively 
“enriching” their state with a new concept, where the word in parenthesis in Figure 3 
represents the concept being conceived. 
 
The second primitive pattern, that we call Realization, or ORO pattern, defines the function 
maker. See Figure 4. The realization of an object coincides with the moment when an object 
assumes its (recognizable) identity in the world. For instance, my car was realized in 2014, 
15 days before I bought it. For an object to be realized, its defining functions must have 
been previously conceived. Figure 4 depicts three important specializations of the pattern, 
namely: (i) the capability of living beings to procreate, (ii) the manufacturing skills by 
which a factory (or a person) can realize objects, e.g., a press, and (iii) the ability of 
“intelligent” machines to assemble new objects. 
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Fig. 7. ‘ORO - Object realization pattern’. 
 
The third primitive pattern, called Destruction, or ODO pattern, defines the function 
destroyer. See Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. ‘ODO - Object destruction pattern’. 
 
ODO patterns represent the process by which an object “disappears” because losing its 
identity. This is the inverse pattern of realization. Thus, eating an orange and a car wrecker 
destroying my car are both instantiations of this pattern. 
 
The last primitive pattern, called Service Provision, or OSO pattern, defines the functions 
provider and receiver. See Figure 6.  
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Fig. 9. ‘OSO - Object service pattern’. 
 
This is the pattern that models the process by which any two objects may affect one another. 
The specialization patterns represent some important specializations, namely: (i) the 
inception of a living being (it is a “service” in the sense that the state of the consumer is 
changed), (ii) a living being acquiring the energy needed to live by eating, and (iii) an 
object affecting the state, e.g., the position, of another object.  
 
The key observation is that the world evolution can be modeled by suitably 
specializing/generalizing and/or by composing OAO patters to produce complex patterns. 
We call the patterns obtained in this way, Producer – Consumer (PC) patterns. The figures 
above provide examples of specializations. PC patterns compose OAO patterns by making 
the consumer of a former pattern coincide with the producer of a latter pattern. 
4.4. Complex patterns 
PC patterns can produce graphs of arbitrary complexity. The simplest versions of PC 
patterns are OAOAO patterns. These patterns are of particular relevance since they 
represent how the application of the function in the first OAO pattern provides input to the 
function applied in the second OAO pattern. Examples of relevant OAOAO patterns are: 
reproduction, which models how something is constructed as a copy of some object, 
transformation which models how objects change their function (e.g., a car transformed 
into a cage or a rock into a chair); undo by which the second function, under certain 
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conditions, cancels the effects of the first function, this allowing to define the inverse 
function; service composition, which models how complex services are provided, online 
or in the world, and so on. As an example of OAOAO pattern, Figure 7 depicts Creation.  
 
 
 
Fig. 10. ‘Creation compound pattern’. 
 
Creation allows for the construction of a new type of object (e.g., presses, in the case of 
Gutenberg’s press). Notice that the central object has two inputs which may occur at 
different times. The first observation is that the double input captures the fact that nothing 
can be created but can only be “transformed” from something else. The second is that what 
we represent is always an approximation, e.g., we could further complicate the above 
pattern to consider more materials, human effort, and so on. 
4.5. Pattern transformations 
PC patterns allow for a uniform representation of the spatio-temporal continuum. However, 
they do not give us the means for univocally representing this continuum as (the evolution 
of) the world where we live. And this could not be the case! As from Section 2, there is a 
many-to-many mapping between substances and substance concepts (i.e., objects) and, as 
from the previous chapter, there is a many-to-many mapping between substance concepts 
and classification concepts, this latter intuition being captured by the two relations FpO 
and OpF introduced in Section 2. These two mappings are at the core of the phenomenon 
of knowledge diversity and formalize two levels of freedom in the representation of the 
spatio-temporal continuum. The first, from substances to objects, corresponds to the many 
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possible ways in which the same substance can be perceived as a certain object. The 
second, from objects to functions, corresponds to the many possible ways in which the 
same object can be reasoned about in terms of the function it performs.  
 
Our solution to the problem of managing diversity in knowledge is to exploit the uniform 
representation provided by PC patterns and define a set of PC pattern transformation 
operators that allow, given any two PC patterns, to reduce one to the other, preserving 
their intended meaning. The intuition is that the existence of such a reduction will be 
evidence that the two PC patterns represent the same or similar configurations of 
substances, and the contrary when this is not the case. Notice how this does not avoid the 
possibility of multiple descriptions of the same (set of) substances, but it does provide a 
systematic approach for absorbing diversity.  
 
We have identified three PC pattern transformation operators, that we call Granularity, 
Abstraction and Partiality, where the combined effects of these three operators allow to 
transform  patterns, still preserving the underlying semantics.22  
 
The Granularity operator allows for two types of transformation: (i) substituting parts with 
wholes or vice versa, and (ii) substituting more specific concepts with more general 
concepts or vice versa. The examples in the previous section are all applications of this 
operator. Figure 8 provides a further example where the pattern at the bottom is obtained 
from the one at the top via a whole-part transformation and a more general-more specific 
transformation.  
 
 
                                                
22 A general formalization of this intuition, not provided here for lack of space, will be provided 
in a follow-up work and will be based on the work described in [43], which provides a 
formalization of the problem of theory transformation in terms of abstraction operators. 
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Fig. 11. ‘Granularity operator’. 
 
The Abstraction (concretization) operator enables the (un)folding of concepts, towards a 
less (more) fine-grained structure; making some concepts implicit (explicit). Figure 9 
provides an example of abstraction (top) and one of concretization (bottom). Notice how 
an Action Object Action pattern gets reduced to a single action and vice versa. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. ‘Abstraction/concretization operator’. 
 
The granularity and the abstraction operators output PC patterns. This is not the case for 
the Partiality operator which outputs two patterns, namely (i) patterns containing only 
actions and functions, that we call AA patterns, and (ii) patterns containing only objects 
and functions, that we call OO patterns. The Partiality operator achieves this result by 
dropping all elements of certain kinds (O or A). Consider for instance Figure 10, where the 
top pattern is obtained from the middle one by dropping objects (and functions) and where 
the bottom pattern is obtained from the middle one by dropping actions. Notice how AA 
patterns focus on the process, as it is done, e.g., in planning and activity recognition (see, 
e.g., [78]) while OO patterns focus on objects and their functions, as it is done, e.g., in 
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Schema.org [5]. The choice of where to focus depends on the purpose of the modeling. We 
call the union of PC patterns, OO patterns and AA patterns, teleology patterns, to capture 
the idea that any representation is chosen to best fit the problem to be solved. 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. ‘Partiality operator’. 
4.6. Teleologies 
Teleology patterns are the basic constituents of Teleologies. Teleologies are nothing else 
but structured organizations of teleology patterns where the horizontal dimension is given 
by the teleology patterns themselves while the vertical dimension follows the “usual” 
more/less general hierarchy. In this respect the name “teleology” has a double motivation 
as, on one side, teleologies allow for the explicit representation of function, while, on the 
other side, are organized as needed for the problem to be solved. 
 
The top part of teleologies is organized in two levels. The root is “Concept”, meaning that 
the focus is on representation rather than on what is the case, as it happens in (upper level) 
ontologies (where, for instance, the root of DOLCE is “Thing” [25] and the root of SUMO 
is “Entity” [79]). In turn, the root has three children, namely “Object”, “Action” and 
“Function”, the last being then further subdivided into “Producer” and “Consumer”. 
Furthermore, functions, objects and actions are linked by the relations defined in Section 
2, i.e., “AaO”, “OaA”, “FpO”, “OpF”, “FpA” and “ApF”. 
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Teleologies are designed to satisfy two main properties: 
 
1. to allow for the representation of teleology patterns, as the way to provide a uniform 
view of the concepts recognized via perception and the concepts used and derived 
via reasoning;  
2. to allow for their continuous modification, via pattern transformation operators, as 
the way by which a teleology can be adapted to integrate new inputs, e.g., new 
concepts needed to represent a new input from perception or from a heterogeneous 
dataset, or concepts coming from another teleology. 
 
Let us start with the first property. For the sake of argumentation, as an example, we can 
assume that we have, as initial set of “relevant” concepts, those which are reported in Table 
1 and are not tagged with “*”. Notice that in Table 1 we have “Person” and “Car” but also 
“LivingBeing” and “Machine”, with the latter two concepts being more general than the 
former two. It is in general a good practice to use a set of high level concepts as collectors 
of functions and actions. Thus, for instance, the functions and actions of “LivingBeing” 
can be inherited by, e.g., “Cat”. The idea is to avoid unnecessary diversity as the more 
general concepts drive the instantiation of their more specific concepts.  
 
 
Table 2. An example of relevant concepts. 
Object Function Action 
LivingBeing {LivingBeing} {Conceive} 
Machine {Machine} {Transport} 
Person {Person, Driver, Maker, Passenger, 
*Rider*} 
{Conceive, Drive, Make, 
*Ride*} 
Car {Car, Vehicle, Transportation} {Transport} 
*Motorcycle* {*Motorcycle*, Vehicle} {Transport} 
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A snapshot of the resulting teleology is reported in Figure 11. 
 
Fig. 14. ‘A small example of teleology’. 
 
The white arrows represent more/less general relations, the black diamonds represent 
associative relations, e.g., “partOf”, “FpO” and “ApF”. The “ApF” links in Figure 11 must 
be read as follows: producers enable the actions in ApF(producer) while consumers are 
affected by the actions in ApF(consumer). Notice how the PC pattern in Figure 2 is 
reconstructed via the associative relations linking “Car”, “Person”, “Vehicle”, “Transport” 
and “Passenger”. Notice also how roles such as, e.g., “driverOf” or vehicleOf”, not 
represented in Figure 11 for lack of space, are more specific concepts than the relation 
resulting from the composition of FpO and ApF. Roles are crucial for the representation of 
OO patterns like the one represented in Figure 10 (bottom). 
 
Let us now see how we can use the same process as above to adapt, e.g., extend/change, 
the current teleology in the presence of a new concept (for instance coming from another 
vocabulary). Consider, for instance, the concept “Car”, classified in  Schema.org23 as a 
                                                
23 http://schema.org/Car  
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“Product” and as a “Vehicle”. This concept is perfectly aligned with that with the same 
name in the teleology in Figure 11. The only (optional) addition is to add “Product” (as a 
function, more precisely as a consumer). Consider now the more complex situation of 
updating the teleology in Figure 11 by adding the object “Motorcycle”, as defined in 
Schema.org24, as a specialization of “Machine”. “Motorcycle” is not present in Figure 11 
nor is there any PC pattern to which it can be connected. The relevant PC pattern(s) can be 
added by applying the granularity operator, more specifically by specializing the function 
“Driver” with “Rider” and the action “Drive” with “Ride”. Figure 12 represents a focus on 
the relevant part of Figure 11 where the new concepts (marked with “*” in Table 1) are 
added. The resulting teleology is now capable of modeling the PC pattern described by the 
natural language sentence ‘a person riding a motorcycle’. 
 
 
Fig. 15. ‘An example of teleology update’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 https://auto.schema.org/Motorcycle  
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Chapter 5 
 
5. Tracing and Exploiting Knowledge Diversity via a Causal Model 
Our knowledge about the world is entangled with one fundamental issue that must be 
handled by any representation, namely world change. The central question is: how can we 
know something as the same thing despite its change? Let us take for instance an everyday 
research item like an article, i.e., a paper. Each encounter with it provides us with multiple 
different pieces of information. Does the article that is on the online repository is the same 
article that is on the table of my apartment in the evening? Does the article that is now 
dusty and sketched is the same article that one week ago was completely clean? Does this 
article is the same article even after cutting away its title page? Does this article that I use 
as rough paper for taking some notes is the same article that was written by my advisor one 
month ago? Does this article remain the same even after being cut into small pieces?   
 
In the context of KR, three are the main state-of-the-art strategies of approaching this 
challenge (see chapter 2 for a detailed survey). The first strategy is to define properties that 
something must have for being that something, where a property is taken as a quality, an 
attribute, or a characteristic describing something. For instance, for being an article 
something must have ‘pages’, a ‘title’, an ‘author’, and so forth. For being the same article, 
something must have the same ‘author(s)’, same ‘DOI’, and so forth. Typical information 
artifacts implementing this strategy are top-level (i.e., foundational) ontologies, like 
Dolce25, for very abstract notions, or core ontologies like Vivo26, devised for modeling 
more concrete notions, like ‘article’ or ‘academic article’. The second strategy is to keep-
track of all the properties that something may have, i.e., that can be present when this 
something is encountered in every possible context. For instance, an article along with 
‘author’, ‘title’ and ‘DOI’, may have a ‘format’, an ‘illustrator’, a ‘review’, a ‘pagination’, 
and so forth. The same article may have different formats, many reviews, many number of 
pages, and so forth. Typical information artifacts implementing this strategy are huge 
                                                
25 http://www.loa.istc.cnr.it/old/DOLCE.html  
26 http://vivoweb.org/ontology/core  
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“catch-all” schemas for structuring a large amount of data like Schema.org27 or 
DBpedia.org28. The third strategy is to provide the properties that something is likely to 
have over encounters in a given context. For instance, an article, in the context of a library 
catalog, is likely to have a ‘location’, an ‘availability’, a ‘sound recording’ and so forth. 
The same article is likely to have the same subject, the same author(s), but not always the 
same location or availability, and so forth. Typical information artifact implementing this 
strategy are database schemas or domain ontologies like the schema underlying Osikat29 
(just check the advanced search) or the bibliographic domain ontology30, which are 
designed for very specific application needs. 
 
All these strategies have significant drawbacks. The first strategy is very difficult to be 
applied. The task of finding identifying properties is indeed an almost impossible task for 
most of the things that can be encountered. Thinks about animals, artifacts, plants, general 
stuff; most of the time it is impossible to find a set of properties that do not change over 
time and that can be used for identifying them over encounters. The definition of article 
provided by Vivo is a perfect example. Not all the articles, for instance, have a ‘DOI’, 
which would seem to be a perfect identifier. The second strategy involves the construction 
of undetermined representations. In order to catch all the possible properties that something 
may have over encounters, the identification criteria are lost or too vague to be applied. 
Consequently, the puzzle of understanding if something is the same or is different from 
something else still remain unsolved. The representation provided by Schema.org is a 
perfect example. The things that can potentially be captured by all the properties associated 
to the schema ‘article’ are very different. See for instance the ambiguity in identifying 
‘news article’ and ‘scholarly article’. The third strategy offers criteria that can be used for 
identifying things only in a given context, which are very difficult to be used outside that 
context. Just think about the property ‘location’ provided by the Osikat schema. It is very 
difficult to find this information about an article, outside the context of a library service. 
 
                                                
27 http://schema.org/  
28 http://wiki.dbpedia.org   
29 http://oskicat.berkeley.edu/search/X  
30 http://bibliographic-ontology.org/  
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Figure 16: Diversity in knowledge and sameness puzzle 
 
Figure 1 shows how the major implications of the above described drawbacks are: i) the 
generation of multiple and diverse representations (i.e., conventionally defined 
descriptions) for the same things; ii) the generation of multiple identifiers, i.e., pointers by 
which we identify something (e.g., URI), that can be related to the same resources, i.e., any 
physical or virtual thing of limited availability within a system [14] (e.g., a web page, an 
Amazon product, an article, and so forth). Just think how many new classes, properties, 
instances and corresponding URIs are created with ontology editors like Protégé whenever 
a new ontology is constructed. Following our example resumed by Figure 1, we can come 
out with puzzling situations where the same article is described and pointed as two articles 
just because we are selecting two different formats (i.e., paper and digital). Moreover, we 
may say that the article that I have on my desk (i.e., the draft of a research work that my 
advisor gave me one year ago) is the same article that now is stored in the library. 
 
The issues of knowledge diversity and unique identifiers for resources that correspond to 
“things” are clearly central issues. They need to be addressed for achieving knowledge 
integration and semantic interoperability. This is why, in the last few years, most of the 
research effort has been devoted on designing the best methods for constructing reusable 
ontologies, and aligning and integrating multiple heterogeneous representations. All these 
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attempts are motivated by the effect produced by the above described approaches to the 
sameness question, which, in turn, is the main reason for the difficulties in reusing and 
managing schemas, ontologies and identifiers of resources that correspond to thing.  
 
In our opinion there is a lack of work on devising a new KR approach for addressing the 
puzzle of sameness without generating the above mentioned difficulties. This new reliable 
methodology would be a promising solution in supporting the current existing knowledge 
integration methodologies. It would help indeed in understanding whether two 
representations are about the same thing, thus exploiting (and not eliminating) the value of 
diversity in knowledge and enabling the reuse of identifiers. 
5.1. Specifying the causal model: PC model 
Where the underlying assumption of the state-of-the-art approaches is that two things are 
the same when they share some specific properties, the underlying assumption of our 
approach is that two things are the same when they are part of the same causal history, 
where we take a causal history to be a sequence of elements related by causal dependencies. 
We call causal model the information object that we use to represent and codify a causal 
history at different levels of complexity. A causal model is a relational structure, its relata 
are Objects, i.e., things of any particular sorts (e.g., animals, artifacts, stuff, and so forth), 
that may cause or be caused. These objects may stand in various relations, for instance, 
spatiotemporal relations and relations of part and whole (for more details see chapter on 
how to model teleologies). Moreover, they are linked by the Actions they perform (e.g., 
running, eating, informing, and so forth). But it is the objects Functions that make a causal 
model. Following the teleosemantics approach, we take Producer and Consumer functions 
as the functions that are used for modeling the causal dependencies in a causal model. For 
instance, ‘writer’ is the producer function of a person who writes something, ‘reader’ is the 
consumer function of a person who read something, and so forth. This way of modeling 
the causal chain of every causal model is what allows us to describe a causal model as a 
Producer-Consumer (PC) Model. 
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5.1.1 PC model nodes 
In the design of the PC Model we began with the core of the PC Patterns modeling effort 
provided in the previous chapter. In a PC Model, “object” is a cover term for those concepts 
that represent what is perceived across encounters. Every object can be thought as the set 
of all the representations of how the same thing “fills” space, any time we encounter it. 
The specification of Object is shown below: 
 
Object = Oid Type [Comment] ; 
Oid = ObjectID ; 
ObjectID = "o" Integer ; 
Type = "kind" | "individual" ; 
Comment = Text ; 
 
The Type nonterminal captures distinctions about the two main possible types of objects. 
Examples of each of these object types are: 
 
1. Kind: person, cat, car, article, … 
2. Individual: Barak Obama, Garfield, Fiat Punto, … 
 
The comment nonterminal is a part of all the PC Model specifications, and exists to allow 
for annotations, adding clarifications and other observations about the element being 
modeled. 
 
“Action” is a cover term for those concepts that represent how objects change in time. 
Actions represent an abstraction over multiple occurrence of changes in time of an object. 
The specification of Action is shown below: 
 
Action = Aid Type [Comment] ; 
Aid = ActionID ; 
ActionID = "a" Integer ; 
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Type = "conceive" | "realize" | "destroy"                 
| "conceive" ; 
Comment = Text ; 
 
The Type nonterminal captures distinctions about the four main possible types of actions. 
Examples of each of these action types are: 
 
1. Conceive: devise, invent, create, … 
2. Realize: give-birth, build, assemble, … 
3. Destroy: eat, burn, wreck, … 
4. Serve: feed, transport, inform, … 
 
Conceive represents the process by which an object, which was not existing before, is 
conceived. Realize represents the activity of building something with or from something 
else, i.e., making it recognizable. Destroy is the inverse of “realize” and represents the 
activity by which an object “disappears”. Serve represents the activity by which any two 
objects may affect one another.  
 
“Function” is a cover term for those concepts that represent the behavior that an object is 
expected to have in a causal chain. The specification of Function is shown below: 
 
Function = Fid Type [Comment] ; 
Fid = FunctionID ; 
FunctionID = "f" Integer ; 
Type = "producer" | "consumer" ; 
Comment = Text ; 
 
The Type nonterminal captures distinctions about the two main possible types of objects. 
Examples of each of these function types are: 
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1. Producer: writer, mother, vehicle, …  
2. Consumer: reader, son, passenger, … 
 
Every object that performs an action plays a specific function. The object that affects 
another object, possibly itself, plays the function of a Producer. The object being 
affected by the action of another object plays the function of a Consumer. The fact that 
objects affect each other by actions and can play the functions of a producer or a consumer 
involves the definition of the notion of State.  
 
“State” is a cover term for those concepts that represent how objects, actions and functions 
change in a causal chain. States describe how objects, actions and functions fill any given 
causal model. The specification of State is shown below: 
 
State = Sid Type [Comment] ; 
Sid = StateID ; 
StateID = "s" Integer ; 
Type = "spatial_state" | "temporal_state" | 
"functional_state" ; 
Comment = Text ; 
 
The Type nonterminal captures distinctions about the three main possible types of states. 
Examples of each of these state types are: 
 
1. Spatial state: weight, heavy, color, position, … 
2. Temporal state: duration, date, before, … 
3. Functional state: active, idle, in love, sick, …  
5.1.2 PC model links 
We capture the fact that an object may perform one or more actions, may play one or more 
functions, and a function may involve one or more actions, by using the “by*” link. This 
link encodes all the possible relations that exist between objects, actions and functions, 
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thus forming the backbone structure of every PC model. The specification of By* is shown 
below: 
 
By* = Bid (FromObject | FromAction | 
FromFunction) (ToObject | 
ToAction | ToFunction) Bond 
[Comment] ; 
Bid = ByID ; 
ByID = "b" Integer ; 
FromObject = IDREF ; 
IDREF = ObjectID ; 
FromAction = IDREF ; 
IDREF = ActionID ; 
FromFunction = IDREF ; 
IDREF = FunctionID ; 
ToObject = IDREF ; 
IDREF = ObjectID ; 
ToAction = IDREF ; 
IDREF = ActionID ; 
ToFunction = IDREF ; 
IDREF = FunctionID ; 
Bond = "admissible" | "proper" 
{default, if absent, is 
"admissible"} ; 
Comment = Text ; 
 
Besides having its own ID, By* has three From* optional IDs and three To* optional IDs, 
this is to allow the selection of the relata of the links. For instance, if the pair of optional 
IDs is FromObject and ToAction it means that the given By* is providing the action 
performed by an object. Notice that we are admitting the case in which By* can be used 
for modeling reflexive relations (e.g., FromObject and ToObject). This can be used 
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for modeling parthood relations (e.g., an object that is a part of another object)31. The major 
function of the Bond nonterminal is to capture the fact that some elements are “expected” 
to be associated to other elements. For instance, the fact that an article has the function of 
informing someone is usually expected. On the contrary, the fact that an article is used as 
scrapbook is just possible, but usually not expected. This can be modeled by saying that 
“being information” is a proper function of an article and ‘being a scrapbook’ is just an 
admissible function of an article.  
 
Together with by* link we provide the st* link. This link encodes all the possible relations 
between objects, actions, functions and their states, thus capturing how the elements of a 
PC model affect each other and how they change over a causal chain. The specification of 
St* is shown below: 
 
St* = Stid FromState 
(ToObject | ToAction | 
ToFunction) [Comment] ; 
Stid = StID ; 
StID = "st" Integer ; 
FromState = IDREF ; 
IDREF = StateID ; 
ToObject = IDREF ; 
IDREF = ObjectID ; 
ToAction = IDREF ; 
IDREF = ActionID ; 
ToFunction = IDREF ; 
IDREF = FunctionID ; 
Comment = Text ; 
 
                                                
31 We are willing to address this issue in our future work. 
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Here, besides the St* ID, we have a FromState nonterminal that is not optional, 
providing the reference state ID, and three optional nonterminal elements, like for the by* 
link i.e., ToObject, ToAction and ToFunction, used for providing the related ID. 
We would like to point out that, at this level of specification, we left implicit a possible 
existing constraint. The type of the source state (spatial, temporal and functional) may 
indeed force the selection of a specific target element. If this is the case, it would mean 
that, for instance, all the temporal states can be only associated to actions and all the 
functional states can be only associated to function.  
 
To illustrate a possible application of By* and St* links, along with the elements specified 
in the previous sub-section, let us consider the two following examples: 
 
(1) a person wrote something one month ago 
<OBJECT Oid="o1" Type="kind"> 
person 
</OBJECT> 
<ACTION Aid="a1" Type="realize"> 
wrote 
</ACTION> 
<STATE Sid="s1" Type="temporal_state"> 
one month ago 
</STATE> 
<By* FromObject="o1" ToAction="a1" bond="proper"/>  
<St* FromState="s1" ToAction="a1"/> 
 
(2) the author of this article is famous 
<FUNCTION Fid="f1" Type="producer"> 
author 
</FUNCTION> 
<OBJECT Oid="O2" Type="kind"> 
article 
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</OBJECT> 
<STATE Sid="s2" Type="functional_state"> 
famous 
</STATE> 
<By* FromFunction="f1" ToObject="o2" bond="proper"/>  
<St* FromState="s2" ToFunction="f1"/> 
5.2. Tracing and exploiting the causal model 
Saying that two things are the same if they are part of the same causal history is like saying 
that something that is happening right now is the same of something that was happening 
some moments ago. We can say that they are the same writing (or the same reading) 
because they are part of the same causal history: it is me (object-producer) writing (action) 
this article (object-consumer). Now, according to this new strategy of approaching the 
sameness puzzle, change can be easily explained through the parts of a causal history. For 
instance, there would be no problems at claiming that the article that yesterday was on the 
online repository is the same article that today is on the table of my apartment. This just 
means focusing on two spatiotemporal parts of that article: the first that yesterday was on 
the online repository, the second that today is in the apartment. Similarly, it would be 
perfectly fine to state that this article and the same article without the title page (and maybe 
without some other pages) are two parts of the same causal history. Moreover, there would 
be no inconsistencies in admitting that we are talking about the same article even after it 
has been cut into small pieces. It is just a matter of considering a longer or a shorter causal 
history for that article.     
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Figure 17: The new way of approaching the sameness puzzle 
Figure 2 shows how the major implications of the above described strategy shift are: i) 
enabling to trace the multiple and diverse representations of the same thing via a single 
representation (i.e., the reference causal history); ii) mitigating the generation of multiple 
identifiers, considering each single representation (class, property or instance) just as a part 
of the same thing (i.e., the reference causal history). 
5.2.1 From KRs to PC model 
The PC model we described in the previous section plays a central role in the computational 
implementation of this new approach. However, a full implementation can be provided 
only by specifying the process that allows to reduce any number of input KRs to a reference 
PC Model and to keep-track of them by exploiting their diversity. We call this process 
Concretization operation and we describe it as follows. 
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(1) Concretization()		
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
	
21	
22	
for	each	krc	and	pcn	
	 	 if	krc	=	<	Class	>	and	pcn	=	<	Object	>	
get	krc	
return	pcn	
end	if	
if	krc	=	<	ObjectPropertyN	>	and	pcn	=	<	Function	>	
get	krc	
return	pcn	
determine	By*	as	Function-Object	link	
end	if	
if	krc	=	<	ObjectPropertyV	>	and	pcn	=	<	Action	>	
get	krc	
return	pcn	
determine	By*	as	Action-Object	link	
determine	By*	as	Action-Function	link		
end	if	
if	krc	=	<	DataProperty	>	and	pcn	=	<	State	>	
get	krc	
return	pcn	
determine	St*	as	State-Object		or	State-Action	
or	State-Function	link	
end	if	
end	for	
 
The inputs of Concretization() are always: i) a knowledge representation construct, i.e., 
krc (as represented in the table above), taken from a given KR (e.g., an ontology with 
classes and properties), and ii) a PC model node, i.e., pcn (as represented in the table above), 
taken from a given PC model (e.g., Person-Author-Write-WrittenWork-Article). Here we 
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consider the possible knowledge representation constructs as the constructs used in OWL32, 
but the set of input reference representation languages can be easily extended, for instance, 
to RDF33 and others. Thus, in this case, on the one hand, a krc can be a class, like ‘Article’, 
an object property like ‘Author’, with range ‘Person’, and a data property like 
‘NumberOfPages’, with datatype ‘Integer’. Notice that we make a central distinction 
between object properties denoted by nouns and object properties denoted by verbs 
(ObjectPropertyN and ObjectPropertyV in the table above). This is in order to make a clear 
distinction among those properties that can be functions and those properties that can be 
actions. On the other hand, a pcn is one of the nodes that we specified in Section 3. Through 
the concretization process each given krc is converted into a given pcn. Moreover, after 
each conversion step a by* link or a st* link is determined. The final expected output is a 
PC Model evoked by the input knowledge representation.  
 
Now, there are two major observations. Firstly, in the example we provided, we assumed 
that all the knowledge representation constructs have an already existing PC model input 
to which they can be associated. However, there may be the case in which, given a krc, no 
pcn can be returned. This situation is handled by evaluating a possible extension of the 
given PC model. This can be done by adding a new object, action, function, or state, or by 
determining a new by* or a new st*. For instance, ‘booking’ and ‘availability’ as 
knowledge representation inputs may involve an evaluation for the enrichment of the given 
PC model with a new state and a new action. If this is the case, given the input object 
property ‘booking’ and the input data property ‘availability’, the concretization process 
returns the action ‘booking’ and the state ‘availability’. It must be noticed that the given 
PC model may have also been left unchanged. This would have meant that the given 
knowledge representation inputs are not taken as part of that causal history representation. 
The second observation is that the output PC model produced by means of the 
concretization operation can be used as input with a new KR, thus producing a new 
extended PC model, including both the given input KRs. If this is the case, it is possible to 
state that: i) the two input KRs are parts of the same causal history, represented by the 
                                                
32 https://www.w3.org/OWL/  
33 https://www.w3.org/RDF/  
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given extended PC model and ii) both the input KRs can be considered as the same by 
integrating them into a unified KR.  
5.2.2 From PC model to KR 
The generation of a unified KR from an extended PC model (including two inputs KRs) 
happens according to another central process, i.e., what we call Abstraction operation. This 
operation can be seen as the inverse of concretization and we describe it as follows. 
 
(2) Abstraction()		
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
for	each	pcn	and	krc	
	 	 if	pcn	=	<	Object	>	and	krc	=	<	Class	>	
get	pcn	
return	krc	
end	if	
if	pcn	=	<	Function	>	and	krc	=	<	Class	>	
get	pcn	
return	krc	
end	if	
if	pcn	=	<	Function	>	and	krc	=	<	ObjectPropertyN	>	
get	pcn	
return	krc	
determine	class	expression	(Class-
ObjectProperty)	
end	if	
if	pcn	=	<	Action	>	and	krc	=	<	Class	>	
get	pcn	
return	krc	
end	if	
if	pcn	=	<	Action	>	and	krc	=	<	ObjectPropertyV	>	
get	pcn	
return	krc	
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23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
29	
30	
31	
32	
33	
determine	class	expression	(Class-
ObjectProperty)	
end	if	
if	pcn	=	<	State	>	and	krc	=	<	Class	>	
get	pcn	
return	krc	
end	if	
if	pcn	=	<	State	>	and	krc	=	<	DataProperty	>	
get	pcn	
return	krc	
determine	class	expression	(Class-
DataProperty)	
end	if	
end	for	
 
 
The inputs of Abstraction() are always: i) a PC model node, i.e., pcn taken from a given 
PC model that may be the result of the integration of more given KRs (see previous 
section); ii) a knowledge representation construct, i.e., krc, taken from two or more input 
KRs. As showed in the table above, every given PC model input object is converted into a 
given class. Every given PC model input function may be converted into a given class or a 
given object property. Every given PC model input action may be converted into a given 
class or a given object property. Every given PC model input state may be converted into 
a given class or a given data property. Moreover, whenever a property is returned, a class 
expression for defining the KR classes is determined. The expected output of the whole 
operation is a KR that is an integration of the two (or more) given KRs. This is possible 
because the input KRs are taken as parts of the same causal history and can be considered 
as different descriptions of the same thing. 
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5.3. A cause study 
We ground the explanation of our approach in the following concrete example. Let us take 
the three reference knowledge representations introduced in Section 2, i.e., the 
Vivoweb.org, the Schema.org and the Oskikat representations of ‘Article’. We consider 
them as KR1, KR2 and KR2 respectively and we represent (a portion of) the corresponding 
schemas (with some instantiation examples) as follows.  
 
Article	–	KR1	
DOI	 abstract	 pageNo	 subject	 date	
#123	 Text	 56	 ai	 01-01-2017	
 
Article	–	KR2	
author	 award	 comment	 editor	 rating	
J.		 Award	‘a’	 4	 K.	 3	stars	
J.	and	M.		 Award	‘a’	 13	 W.	 4	stars	
 
Article	–	KR3	
title	 author	 location	 language	 availability	
Text	 J.	and	M.	 Data	Lab	 Eng	 Boolean	
 
In this example we take the table labels as classes and the field labels as either object 
properties or data properties. Suppose that there is a need to check whether these are three 
representations of the same thing. We solve this problem via Concretization(). Let us 
assume that the reference PC model, i.e., PC0, has been already constructed and that a 
representation of it, with the concepts that are relevant to this example, is as reported in 
Tab. 1 (the terms in “*” are the result of the iterative application of the concretization 
operation, as described below). 
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Table 3: An example of PC Model  
Object	 Function	 Action	 State	
Person	 {Author,	
*Editor*}	
{Write,	*Edit*}	 {Date}	
Article	 {Realization,		
*Edition*}	
{null}	 {DOI,	Abstract,	PageNo,	*Subject*,	Award,	
Rating,	Title,	Location,	Language,		
*Availability*}	
 
The concretization operation is processed sequentially. The first application of the 
operation takes KR1 and PC0 as given inputs and return PC1 as expected output. The second 
application of the operation takes KR2 and PC1 as given inputs and return PC2 as expected 
output. The third application of the operation takes KR3 and PC2 as given inputs and return 
PC3 as expected output. Every time we run the operation we may encounter the following 
situations.  
 
1. a KR input is returned into a given PC input. In the example this may be the case of 
the ‘DOI’ property, which is returned into a corresponding state (see Tab. 1); 
2. a KR property input of a KR class input that is returned as a PC Model object, is 
returned as a state that in the PC model is associated to an action. In the example this 
is the case for ‘Date’ that in KR1 is a property of ‘Article’ but in PC0 it is a temporal 
state either of ‘Writing’ or ‘Editing’. This situation is handled just by returning the 
associations as they are modeled in the PC model; 
3. a KR input (i.e., a class or a property) cannot be associated to any PC input (i.e., the 
corresponding term does not occur in the given PC model). In the example this is the 
case for ‘Subject’ (in KR1), ‘Editor’ (in KR2) and ‘Availability’ (in KR3). This 
situation can be handled by: 
a. enriching the reference PC model with one corresponding element. For 
instance, ‘Date’ and ‘Subject’ will be present in PC1 and ‘Availability’ in PC3 
(see term marked with ‘*’ in Tab. 1); 
b. enriching the reference PC model by adding more elements. For instance, the 
producer function ‘Editor’ will be present in PC2 along with the consumer 
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function ‘Edition’ and the action ‘Editing’ (see term marked with ‘*’ in Tab. 
1). This solution is usually provided whenever the causal chain encoded by the 
PC model is extended with a new core element (i.e., object, function, action). 
 
Once the concretization process is finished, the final PC model output, i.e., PC3, according 
to the given example, can be used as input of Abstraction(). This can be done for 
generating: 
 
1. one of the previous knowledge representation inputs, KR1, KR2 or KR3. For instance, 
the representation of ‘Article’ provided by KR1; 
2. a new representation for the previous input KRs elements. For instance, we may 
have an article with just ‘DOI’, ‘rating’, ‘title’ and ‘author’ (collapsing all the 
information provided by ‘Author’, i.e., ‘J.’ and ‘J. and M.’ are taken as ‘J. and M.’); 
3. a new representation for a new KR element. For instance, we may run abstraction 
for creating a new class labeled as ‘Editor’; 
4. a new representation that is the result of the integration of the previous input KRs. 
For instance, we may have a KR that is the result of the integration between KR1 
with KR2, or between KR1, KR2 and KR3.  
 
The example process described above highlights various key features of our approach. Let 
us analyze them. Firstly, it seems plausible to assume that the PC model can be used for 
modelling a huge varieties of concepts. As a cross-check we can take any online vocabulary 
and see whether its concepts can be modeled according to our approach. Let us take, for 
instance, some of the Schema.org “commonly used types”. The ‘CreativeWork’ type can 
be easily seen as a kind of object. The type ‘Event’ can be seen as the result of an 
abstraction operation that combines information derived from objects, actions and 
functions together (just think about the reading of an article). We have the same situation 
for the concept ‘Person’. Similarly, the type ‘Place’ can be easily captured by abstracting 
from an object just some specific ‘SpatialStates’. A similar check can be performed for all 
the Schema.org concepts that are commonly used as properties. For instance, a property 
like ‘Creator’ can be mapped into a function. The same happens for properties like ‘Read’, 
‘Write’, and so forth, that can be mapped into actions, or properties like PageNo, Title, 
  92 
Language, etc., which can be easily mapped into states. The possible domains and 
codomains for each property is simply captured by the by* and st* relations codified in the 
PC model. For instance, the domain and codomain of the property ‘Creator’ can be derived 
from the by* used for linking it to ‘Person’ and ‘Article’. Secondly, it is interesting to 
consider in depth the concretization operation and the role played by the reference PC 
model. Every concretization operation output is indeed a PC model that is built from the 
integration of multiple KR inputs. This underline how every PC model is a highly flexible 
conceptual structure and can guarantee for the interoperability of different KRs. As we 
have showed above, a PC model can be continuously adapted and tuned over time with 
more information. The upshot is that, projecting the knowledge representations over a 
causal chain, the different conceptualizations seem to be always compatible and do not 
generate inconsistencies. This flexibility is essential in supporting central tasks like 
knowledge acquisition and adaptation, and is required primary for tracing and exploiting 
knowledge diversity. Finally, our approach may also provide interesting insights on how 
to integrate different computational approaches to the representation of concepts.  A PC 
model, depending on the perspective adopted, can be seen, for instance, as a grounding for 
both a symbolic and connectionist view of concepts. By means of abstraction, the 
constructs composing a PC model can be easily mapped, as we have showed above, into a 
class-relational structure. Similarly, by means of concretization, the basic constructs of a 
class-relational structure can be transformed into a representation that is very similar to the 
formalism used for representing a neural network. Objects, functions and actions can be 
taken, indeed, for representing the (internal) units composing the hidden layer of a 
connectionist network. States and state types, can be taken for representing the external 
(input/output) units. The pivotal point here is that it seems possible to provide an account 
for different conceptual modelling formalisms by using a single reference conceptual 
modeling frame. 
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Part III 
Conclusion 
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Chapter 6 
 
6. Conclusions and future work 
In this thesis, besides providing a shared terminology for the characterization of concepts 
and for their computational representation, we have provided a characterization of concepts 
as (recognition) abilities. We showed how this new characterization of concepts can be 
mapped to the notion of concepts studied so far in KR, what we call classification concepts. 
We exploited this characterization to develop RAO, a first version of an ontology of 
concepts as recognition abilities and we showed how it can be used to characterize which 
classification concepts are only nominals or also substance concepts.  
 
Moreover, we have shown how the world can be modeled in terms of three concepts at 
three increasing levels of abstractions: objects which represent the result of the perception 
of substances, actions which represent how substances change in time, and functions which 
represent the expected behaviour of objects. These three notions have allowed us to 
introduce PC patterns and then teleologies as a first step towards a general solution of the 
knowledge and data integration problem. To this extent, we have briefly described how 
teleologies can be tuned to the specific problem and later adapted as needed, following a 
precise methodology.  
 
As a final outcome, we described how tracing diversity via a causal model can represent a 
first foundational step towards the implementation of an adaptive KR system. Because of 
the use of what we call PC model and the sharp distinction between the “causal layer” and 
the “representational layer”, it is possible to address the lack of generality that affect current 
KR approaches. We exploited some of the Millikan’s main findings to design an 
architecture which integrate perception, knowledge acquisition and knowledge (re-)use, 
and we showed how any representation can be seen as the result of an adaptive process.  
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6.1. Future work 
A number of paths with opportunities to extend the scope of this thesis were left for future 
work, either for lack of time or limitation of resources. In what follows we describe some 
of these paths. The first and most obvious is to analyze and implement possible 
improvements of the proposed approach, as well as its evaluation. For instance, we would 
like to further refine RAO and its use in the identification of classification concepts which 
are also substance concepts. We are also interested to exploit these ideas in the 
implementation of an integrated system that deploys both a recognition and a knowledge 
representation function. This work will consist in the development of large scale 
teleologies (including a full formalization of schema.org) and a reference top-level 
teleology. Another aspect that we are interested in is the development of a detailed 
methodology for the construction of teleologies (and corresponding PC models) and related 
KRs, together with the implementation of an ad hoc editor for the creation of teleologies, 
and the exporting and the importing of reference knowledge representations.  
 
By last, we mentioned throughout the thesis that our work takes into consideration main 
biosemantics principles, proposing a first computational view of the biosemantics frame 
that facilitate the distinction between substance and classification concepts. As part of the 
future work, we are interested in extending the proposed formalization.  This requires a 
more deeply study of biosemantics in the context of artificial intelligence, which may in 
turn require a re-design of some of the proposed formalizations. Although we are aware of 
the challenges of this line of work, we also believe it represents the most interesting path 
for a future work. 
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